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1 
ABSTRACT 
 
Although social psychology argues that racial stereotypes and prejudice are related to 
less empathy, studies examining this relationship in the field of neuropsychology are 
rare. 37 White participants were presented videos showing White or Black hands 
being either penetrated by a needle (pain condition) or touched by a Q-tip (no pain 
condition) while we measured desynchronization of the alpha range (7-14 Hz) 
employing EEG. 32 participants were presented the same stimuli as the other 37 
participants, with the difference that in this EEG session the hands were digitally 
colored violet in order to control for the factor of visual familiarity with the stimuli. 
In line with the paradigm ‘empathy for pain’, pain conditions elicited greater alpha 
desynchronization than did no pain conditions in the frontal, central, parietal and 
occipital area. This empathy for pain response was significantly lower for original 
colored Black stimuli than original colored White stimuli in the central, parietal and 
occipital area. Since in the central area this empathy for pain response was similar for 
original colored White, unfamiliar violet colored White and unfamiliar violet colored 
Black stimuli, but lower for original colored Black stimuli, the visual familiarity with 
the stimuli did not influence that empathy for pain was modulated by racial group 
membership. We argue that the alpha desynchronization we assess can be interpreted 
as somatosensory alpha desynchronization, because pain stimuli are somatosensory in 
their nature, because somatosensory desynchronization was mainly found in a time 
interval in which no motion is present in the videos and because other studies from 
our research field also defend interpretations of suppressed somatosensory 
oscillations and somatosensory desynchronization. The empathy for pain response 
correlated with painfulness and unpleasantness ratings of the EEG stimuli as well as 
with an explicit measurement of personal distress. The electrophysiological racial 
bias for empathy for pain did not correlate with implicit or explicit measurements of 
racial bias. However, a racial bias calculated based on painfulness and unpleasantness 
ratings of the EEG stimuli correlated with White preference and feelings towards 
Blacks. 
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3 
Introduction  
 
It is hypothosized that empathy has evolved because of the evolutionary adavantages 
it brings with it; advantages such as being safer from predators and danger, being 
cared for from birth by other members of the group, and having rewarding emotions 
of affiliation and love for others. Hence, one could say that empathy is the core social 
ability that allows us to live in social groups. Importantly though,  as Allport (1954)  
pointed out in the 1950s,  the existence of an in-group, a group such as one´s family, 
one´s neighborhood or one´s city, always inherently implies the existence of an out-
group. This raises the question of whether individuals have more empathy for a 
member of their in-group than someone considered to be in an out-group. In fact, 
studies from the field of Social Psychology have already found support for the 
hypothesis that racial group membership modulates empathy (Yabar, Johnston, Miles, 
& Peace 2006; Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem 2006). Just recently, the young field 
of Social Neuroscience has begun to investigate the relationship between racial group 
membership and empathy for pain - ‘empathy for pain’ describing the phenomenon of 
having empathy when seeing someone else in pain. So far, it has been found that 
racial bias modulates affective components of empathy for pain measured with fMRI 
(Xu, Zuo, Wang, & Han 2009) and motor components of empathy for pain measured 
with TMS (Avenanti, Sirigu, & Aglioti 2010). However, to our knowledge no study 
has yet assessed whether racial bias modulates somatosensory components of 
empathy for pain. This thesis addresses the question of whether alpha 
desynchronization measured with EEG during empathy for pain is modulated by 
racial group membership. We argue that the alpha desynchronization we assess can 
be interpreted as somatosensory alpha desynchronization, because our pain stimuli 
are somatosensory in their nature, and because somatosensory desynchronization is 
generally found in a time interval in which no motion is observable in our stimuli. 
Furthermore, other research from our field defends this interpretation of suppressed 
somatosensory oscillations and somatosensory desynchronization (Stancák, 2006; 
Cheng, Yang, Lin, Lee, & Decety, 2008; Whitmarsh, Nieuwenhuis, Barendregt, & 
Jensen, 2011). 
4 
In order to master the endevaour of presenting our study in a structured way, the 
following outline for this thesis was developed: 
 
First, the theoretical background on empathy is reviewed by highlighting 
etymological roots and definitions of empathy, differentiating empathy from 
sympathy, discussing in detail how and why empathy might have evolved, describing 
how empathy might lead to prosocial behavior and explaining how bottom-up and 
top-down processes of empathy develop (see chapter „1.1 Definitions of Empathy“). 
Afterwards, it is explained that in the field of Social Neuroscience empathy is usually 
assessed with the paradigm ‘empathy for pain’, neuroscientific research on affective, 
motor and somatosensory components of empathy is reviewed, followed by the 
specific description of how the most recent studies employ the event-related 
desynchronization method to assess somatosensory desynchronization during 
empathy for pain (see chapter „1.2 Neuroscience of Empathy“). The theoretical 
portion continues with a section illustrating the relationship between empathy and 
racial group membership, and a discussion of the fact that only affective and motor 
components, but not somatosenseroy components of  empathy for pain have been past 
targets of research. Concluding this section, there is an explanation of why one also 
has to consider the factor of familiarity when looking at the relationship between 
empathy and racial group membership (see chapter „1.3 Empathy, Racial Group 
Membership and Familiarity“). 
 
Based on this theoretical part, the emperical part begins with the research question 
and design for this study including detailed hypothesis (see chapter „2 Design“) and 
then continues with the methodological realization of the study including descriptions 
of participant characteristics, stimuli, procedure as well as EEG and behavioral 
measurements (see chapter „3 Methods“). Finally the results of this study are reported 
(see chapter „4 Results“) and discussed (see chapter „5.1 Interpretation of Main 
Results). The thesis concludes with ideas for future research (see chapter 5.2) and 
theoretical and practical implications (see chapter 5.3). 
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1. THEORY  
 
1.1. Definitions of Empathy 
 
1.1.1 Empathy as a Construct 
 
In the realm of the German movement of psychological aesthetics, Robert Vischer 
invented the term “Einfühlung” in 1873 to describe the notion of feeling into 
something, to see it from the inside (Vischer, 1873). The term was greatly promoted 
by works on art and aesthetics from the German philosopher Theodor Lipps  - 
causing Sigmund Freud to write about it in terms of understanding a joke or even 
understanding one’s patient by putting oneself in his or her place (Pigman, 1995). In 
order to translate Einfühlung Edward Titchner coined the English term ‘empathy’ in 
1909 (Wispé, 1968). In the 1950’s the term empathy was mainly used to describe a 
cognitive process in clinical settings, but in the 1960’s social psychologists began to 
use the term more in the context of feeling a congruent emotion with someone else 
(Batson, Fultz, Schoenrade, 1987). Then, in the 1970’s the term began to be used 
even more narrowly, being defined as emotions that are more other-focused than self-
focused (Batson et al., 1987). 
 
Daniel Batson (2009) disentangled the various definitions psychologists have given 
the term ‘empathy’ by describing eight related but distinct phenomena attributable to 
it: 
 
● Concept 1 “knowing another person’s internal state, including his or her 
thoughts and feelings” can be thought of as cognitive empathy; 
● concept 2 “adopting the posture or matching the neural responses of an 
observed other” is related to imitation and motor or facial mimicry; 
● concept 3 “coming to feel as another person feels” describes affective 
empathy or emotional contagion; 
10 
● concept 4 “intuiting or projecting oneself into another’s situation” is also 
called aesthetic empathy; 
● concept 5 “imagining how another is thinking and feeling” is mostly referred 
to as an “imagined other” perspective; 
● concept 6 “imagining how one would think and feel in the other’s place” is 
also referred to as an “imagine-self” perspective; 
● concept 7 “feeling distress at witnessing another person’s suffering” describes 
the important concept of personal distress; 
● concept 8 “feeling for another person who is suffering” relates to empathic 
concern or simply ‘sympathy’ (Batson, 2009, pp. 4-8). 
 
In sum, the broad multidisciplinary field of empathy research - reaching from  
conceptual analysis of philosophy to empirical investigations of science - has led to 
countless definitions. However, studying these definitions one can reach the 
conclusion that empathy is a psychological construct being latent in nature, not 
directly observable and therefore only definable in hypothesis and manifest processes 
that work on this hypothesis. In the realms of this thesis empathy will mainly be 
studied as it relates to the following definition by Jean Decety: 
 
Empathy is “the ability to recognize emotions and feelings of others with a 
minimal distinction between self and other” (Decety, 2010, p. 258). 
 
 
1.1.2 Difference between Empathy and Sympathy 
 
Sympathy is an older and more frequently used term than empathy; Chismar 
elaborates “it was used by Galens and Hippocrates for an affection or sensitivity of 
the body, while Aristotle used it to speak of being affected by like feelings. Epicurus 
spoke of sympathy in terms of a sense of affinity or Koinonia, and the Stoics 
appealed to the `sympathethic vibrations´ found in music. The term became 
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especially prominent in the eighteenth century in the writings of the British moralists” 
(Chismar, 1988, p. 258). 
 
Even though the terms empathy and sympathy sound very similar, they are crucially 
different from each other. While to empathize means that one recognizes and shares 
another’s observed emotional state, to sympathize means that one empathizes and in 
addition has a positive regard or concern for the other person - in other words: while 
one might empathizes with all characters of a novel, one is likely to sympathize only 
with the hero (Chismar, 1988). Eisenberg and Eggum (2009) therefore pointedly 
conclude that empathy can evolve into sympathy.  
 
 
1.1.3 Evolutionary Functions of Empathy 
 
In regard to the question why we are empathetic, one could answer shortly because it 
gives us an adaptive advantage to the environment in the struggle for life. Being able 
to understand other’s emotions helps one’s self to avoid pain, risk and hunger. An 
example in a typical fight-or-flight situation: When one individual of a group detects 
a predator and expresses fear or aggression, it is very helpful that other members can 
immediately understand the emotions of the distressed individual. In doing so, 
members of the group are either able to help the individual in distress, or flee and at 
least save their own life in the presence of danger. Also, this `more eyes´ 
phenomenon - meaning more eyes can detect predators - “allows individuals to spend 
more time on other activities that promote reproductive success such as feeding and 
finding mates” (Preston & de Waal, 2002, p. 6). However, surviving predators is only 
one of many evolutionary tasks in which empathy plays a key role. Another one, for 
example, is maternity care: The ability of parents to empathize with their child 
directly relates to their ability to provide the right care and ultimately ensure the 
child’s survival, and thus the survival of their genes into the next generation. Taking 
this argument further, one also has to speak about the more socially bonding 
functions of empathy. For instance, members of a social group may express their 
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empathy for one another by means of mimicry, meaning that they may “automatically 
and continuously mimic and synchronize their movements with the facial 
expressions, voices, postures, movements, and instrumental behaviors of others” 
(Hatfield, Rapson, & Le, 2009). This allows them not only to have emotion 
contagion, catching the emotions of others (Hatfield et al., 2009), but very 
importantly to create affiliation and rapport in a non-conscious way (Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003). In fact, people who experienced failure to affiliate in an interaction, 
demonstrate more mimicry later (Lakin et al., 2003). It is such affiliation and rapport 
that is highly necessary for well-functioning groups and societies. Hence, Carter, 
Harris and Porges (2009) arrive at the conclusion that the phenomenon of empathy is 
not only closely linked to self-awareness but also social awareness. In sum, being 
able to understand the emotions of others by empathizing allows oneself to live in 
social groups and strive from evolutionary advantages that this brings with it - such as 
being safer from predators and danger, being cared for from birth by other members 
of the group and having rewarding emotions of affiliation and love for others. 
 
When discussing these things, it is fundamentally important to distinguish between 
proximate and ultimate causes; according to Mayer “proximate causes govern the 
responses of the individual (and his organs) to immediate factors of the environment 
while ultimate causes are responsible for the evolution of the particular DNA code of 
information with which every individual of every species is endowed” (Mayer, 1961, 
p. 1503). Ultimate causes can be described by the perception-action model of 
empathy by Preston and de Waal (2002) which explains that perceiving a kin member 
performing an action often automatically leads to oneself performing the same action 
- sometimes without even noticing it. For example, social facilitation experiments 
with hyenas that live in captivity showed that when one hyena drinks there is a 70 
percent probability that an observing hyena drinks in the next few minutes 
(Glickman, Zabel, Yoerg, Weldele, Drea, & Frank, 1997). Preston and de Waal 
(2002) argue that in the context of empathy when helping a distressed neighbor, a 
proximate explanation would be that you feel their pain and an ultimate explanation 
would be that eventually you would want them to reciprocate. Hence, one way of 
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interpretation would be that the most ultimate function of empathy is kin selection, 
meaning that you, your kin, and therefore the genes of you and your kin survive into 
the next generation. 
 
Another question the evolutionary perspective is able to address is whether animals 
have empathy. In this regard, often the term “emotion contagion” is used, which 
Singer and Lamm (2009) describe as phenomenon that is more primitive than 
empathy and often precedes it; they define emotion contagion as “tendency to catch 
other people’s emotions” (Singer & Lamm, 2009, p. 83). Results of a number of 
studies show that animals at least experience emotion contagion: mice who saw their 
cage-mates suffer from stomach pains subsequently displayed higher pain sensitivity 
(Langford, Crager, Shehzad, Smith, Sotocinal, Levenstadt, Chanda, Levitin, & Mogil, 
2006); mice showed physiological stress symptoms after hearing distress calls from 
conspecifics (Chen, Panksepp, & Lavis, 2009); mice who observed other mice getting 
shocked showed a freezing reaction (Jeon, Kim, Chetana, Jo, Ruley, Lin, Rabah, 
Kinet, & Shin, 2010). Moreover, other studies demonstrated that many animals also 
have prosocial behavior: Rats stopped pressing a lever when this caused another rat to 
receive an electric shock (Church, 1959), they pressed a lever when this brought 
down a distressed rat from a holster (Rice & Gainer, 1962), they even pushed a 
handle to pass food to another rat - especially if they had been helped before (Rutte & 
Taborsky, 2007). Even more complex is the prosocial behavior of primates: Monkeys 
stopped pulling a chain for food when this caused another monkey to receive an 
electrical shock, and in some cases starved themselves rather than pulling the chain 
(Masserman, Wechkin, Terris, 1964). In another study, chimpanzees showed helping 
behavior not only for conspecifics but also for human caregivers irrespective of being 
rewarded (Warneken, Hare, Melis, Hanus, & Tamasello, 2007). All these studies 
show that animals, and among them especially primates, share crucial components of 
empathy with humans. However, humans have the most developed empathy abilities. 
Examples of the higher order empathic abilities include being able to have empathy 
not only in an acute situation but also when imagining situations and being able to 
have empathy with all sorts of animals and even plants. Such highly developed 
14 
empathy may have also contributed to (or has co-evolved with) human’s derivate 
talents of language, symbolism and abstract thought. 
 
 
1.1.4 Empathy, Personal Distress and Pro-social 
Helping Behavior 
 
One of the most interesting questions when discussing empathy is whether higher 
levels of empathy in cognitive or affective components measured by questionnaires 
or tests always translates to more behavior expressing these empathic attitudes and 
emotions in a pro-social manner. In regard to this question, Batson developed a 
model which proposes two pathways (Batson et al., 1987; see Figure 1): 
 
1. First, if one feels empathy when seeing someone else in distress the likelihood of 
having an altruistic motivation to reduce the other’s distress and displaying pro-social 
helping behavior increases. In the Batson Scale (Batson et al., 1987), empathy is 
characterized by the adjectives sympathetic, moved, compassionate, tender, warm, 
softhearted. 
 
2. Second, if one feels personal distress when seeing someone else in distress the 
likelihood of having an egoistic motivation to reduce one’s own distress and therefore 
not to display prosocial helping behavior (or only displaying helping behavior with 
the ultimate goal to decrease one’s own and not the other’s distress) increases. In the 
Batson Scale (Batson et al., 1987), personal distress is characterized by adjectives 
such as alarmed, grieved, upset, worried, disturbed, perturbed, distressed, troubled.  
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Figure 1. Batson´s model explaining the relationship between empathy, personal 
distress and helping behavior. From “Empathy and Distress”, by C. D. Batson, J. 
Fultz and P. A. Schoenrade, 1987, Journal of Personality, 55-1, p. 25. Reprinted with 
first author’s permission. 
 
Several points in regard to this model need to be considered. First, this model heavily 
leans on McDougall’s view that qualitative distinctions between emotions exist and 
that they evoke different goals and motivations (Batson et al., 1987). However, there 
are other views. For instance, while Batson et al. (1987) argued that you may want to 
reduce the distress of a person in need, Hume assumed that seeing someone else in 
distress leads to a more general emotional state of arousal with the ultimate goal 
always being to reduce one’s own arousal and not to with the ultimate goal to reduce 
the other’s arousal (Chismar, 1988). Nonetheless, Batson´s model is supported by 
empirical evidence and therefore seems to be to most broadly accepted. Secondly, 
Batson et al. (1987) stress that the questions Batson´s model attempts to address 
“concern the nature of the motivation to help associated with individual differences - 
whether naturally occurring or induced by experimental manipulation - in empathic 
emotion in a particular situation, not with individual differences in dispositional 
empathy” (Batson et al., 1987, p. 21). Third, it is highly discussed as to what extent a 
motivation or behavior can be called altruistic if their effect is a reward such as 
money, (self-) respect or escape of censure. Batson et al. (1987) draw the line by 
proposing that as long as the effects are not ultimate goals but merely the 
consequences of behavior, then the motivation is still altruistic (Batson et al., 1987). 
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1.1.5 Bottom-up and Top-Down Processes of Empathy 
 
The definitions, theories and models that have been explained so far involve both 
bottom-up processes (i.e. sensory and perceptual driven) and top-down processes (i.e. 
cognitive and regulatory driven). For instance, the processes of mimicry and emotion 
contagion function in a bottom-up framework, while processes of perspective-taking 
and prosocial helping behavior function in a top-down framework. Jean Decety´s 
model of empathy strives towards forging together these bottom-up and top-down 
processes by drawing on developmental neuroscience and explaining three levels of 
empathy: “(1) affective arousal, a bottom-up process grounded in perception-action 
coupling in which the amygdala, hypothalamus and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 
underlie rapid and prioritized processing of the emotional signal; (2) emotion 
understanding, which relies on self- and other-awareness and involves the medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vm)PFC and 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and; (3) emotion regulation, which depends on 
executive functions instantiated in the intrinsic corticocortical connections of the 
OFC, mPFC and dorsolateral (dl)PFC, as well as on connections with subcortical 
limbic structures implicated in processing emotional information” (Decety, 2010, p. 
260). This model is supported by a number of studies which invent very thoughtful 
experimental designs for infants in order to explore the question of when empathy 
begins to develop. One of the most interesting is a study by Martin and Clark (1987) 
which assessed whether babies of a mean age of only 18.3 hours cried when listening 
to audiotapes of recorded crying vocalizations. The results showed not only that 
babies started to cry heavily when listening to the audio tapes, but also that they cried 
significantly more when listening to cries of babies their own age than when listening 
to babies of 11 months or when listening to baby chimpanzees. These results can be 
interpreted in the way that babies already show emotion contagion only hours after 
being born. Another interesting study with 18- and 25-months-olds was conducted by 
Vaish, Carpenter and Tomasello (2009): According to their results, when toddlers 
observed one adult harming another adult by taking away possessions, the toddlers 
showed concern and even prosocial behavior towards the victim. However, Decety 
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argues that it is most important that empathy gradually develops as part of the 
development of emotions and that one can really only speak of empathy as a higher-
order emotion at around the second and third years of life, when self-awareness and 
the ability to differentiate between oneself and others is at a more pronounced state 
due to the development of the prefrontal cortex (Decety, 2010). One could also relate 
Decety´s model and its developmental aspects of empathy and their related brain 
regions to an evolutionary perspective: Some conclusions one may draw would be 
that the development of the different levels of empathy – with “affective arousal” 
being given at birth and the “emotional understanding” and “emotional regulation” 
arising at around three to six months and continually developing into adulthood – 
aligns with the evolutionary age of the related brain regions which Paul MacLean 
(1990) describes relatively easily with his model of the triune brain that explains the 
brain stem and the cerebellum as the very old “reptilian brain”, the limbic system as 
the “old mammalian brain” and the neocortex as the brain with higher executive 
functions. 
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1.2 Neuroscience of Empathy  
 
1.2.1 Paradigm “Empathy for Pain” 
 
There are many ways to measure empathy. In the field of social neuroscience 
(Cacioppo & Bemtson, 1992), empathy is often measured by recording reactions to 
observing others in pain. The paradigm empathy for pain tests that the same neural 
representations become activated both when observing others in pain and when 
experiencing pain one’s self. The perception-action model of empathy says that “The 
attended perception of the object’s state automatically activates the subject’s 
representation of the state, situation, and object, and the activation of these 
representations automatically primes or generates the associated autonomic and 
somatic responses, unless inhibited” (Preston & de-Waal, 2000, p. 4). Indeed, the 
existence of single neurons in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) which become 
activated during both the sensation and perception of pain has been revealed 
(Hutchinson, Davis, Lozano, Tasker & Dostrovsky, 1999). Moreover, a correlation 
was found between trait empathy as measured by self-report questionnaire scores and 
the degree to which the ACC and the Anterior Insula (AI) become activated during 
the sensation and perception of pain (Singer, Seymour, O`Doherty, Kaube, Dolan & 
Frith, 2004). These findings are thought to provide the neural mechanisms for the link 
between direct pain perception and interpreting the observation of others in pain and 
therefore for the phenomenon of “empathy for pain”. 
 
 
1.2.2 Pain Matrix  
 
Decety and Lamm (2009) have provided a detailed categorization system for brain 
regions involved in empathy which they call the “Pain Matrix” (see figure 2). This 
schematic representation highlights that there is no single brain region where the 
ability to empathize originates, but a number of brain regions, and the complex 
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connections between them, create the ability of empathy. Many studies have 
contributed to the realization of Decety´s and Lamm´s (2009) pain matrix: Initially, 
studies such as the ones from Singer et al. (2004) or Jackson, Meltzoff and Decety 
(2005) indicated significant activation during the observation of pain in the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), medial cingulate cortex (MCC) and the anterior insula (AI). 
However, recently Avenanti, Bueti, Galati, Aglioti (2005) also found significant 
activation during pain observation in the sensorimotor cortex. Hence, Decety and 
Lamm (2009) concluded that the ACC and the insula represent the affective and 
motivational aspects of pain - such as emotional evaluation of the stimuli and 
preparation of a response, while the primary somatosensory cortex (S1) and the 
secondary somatosensory cortex (S2) represent sensory aspects of pain - such as 
discrimination of the location and intensity of the stimulus (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Decety´s and Lamm´s categorization system for brain regions involved in 
empathy called “pain matrix”. The yellow fields denote areas playing a primary role 
for empathy. From “Empathy versus Personal Distress”, by J. Decety and C. Lamm, 
2009, in Ickes and Decety, 2009, p. 202. Reprinted with second author’s permission. 
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It is crucial to stress some significant aspects when discussing this model. First, the 
overlap of brain regions that become significantly activated when observing someone 
in pain and when being in pain oneself is far from complete (Jackson, Rainville & 
Decety, 2006). Second, “vicariously instigated activations in the pain matrix are not 
necessarily specific to the emotional experience of pain; they may be shared by other 
processes such as somatic monitoring, negative stimulus evaluation, and the selection 
of appropriate musculoskeletal movements of aversions” (Decety & Lamm, 2009, p. 
202).  
 
 
1.2.3 Affective, Motor and Somatosensory Components 
of Empathy  
 
Bastiaansen, Thioux and Keysers (2009) suggest one should categorize affective, 
(sensory-) motor and somatosensory components of the pain matrix (see figure 3). 
Affective components are often assessed with functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI), motor components with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and 
somatosensory components with magnetoencephalography (MEG) or 
electroencephalography (EEG). Two intricacies related to this separation into 
different components of empathy need to be pointed out. First, one should not 
assume, since many studies mainly focus on one of these components, that these 
brain areas do not interact during the experience and observation of pain. For 
example, using MEG Betti, Zappasodi, Rossini, Aglioti and Tecchio (2009) 
demonstrated that band coherence values signaling crosstalk between sensory and 
motor cortices significantly increased when watching videos of hands being painfully 
penetrated by a needle as compared to watching hands being touched or at rest. 
Similarly, Han, Fan, Xu, Quin, Wu, Wang, Aglioti and Mao (2009) inferred 
interactions between affective and somatosensory components because their results 
showed that when watching painful stimuli in an emotional context, affective 
responses decrease while somatosensory responses increase. Second, although 
affective components are often assessed with fMRI, motor components with TMS, 
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and somatosensory components with MEG or EEG, it can be of value to employ 
other neuroscientific measures in order to validate findings about specific 
components of empathy for pain. 
 
Figure 3. Schematic representation of affective, motor and somatosensory 
components, derived from Baastiansen et al.´s (2009) review.  
 
Affective Components of Empathy 
 
Affective components of empathy for pain are the ACC, more specifically the 
posterior ACC, the anterior MCC and the anterior insula (reviewed in Singer & 
Lamm, 2009), which are most commonly and directly assessed with fMRI. Singer et 
al. (2004) used fMRI to compare brain activity when participants received painful 
stimuli and when participants observed a signal indicating that their partner, present 
in the same room, was experiencing a painful stimulation. In both conditions the 
bilateral anterior insula and the rostral cingulate cortex were activated. Recent studies 
especially try to analyze intra- and interpersonal as well as situational influences on 
the activity of the ACC and the AI when observing others in pain. For instance, 
Lamm, Meltzoff and Decety (2010) assessed how participants empathized with 
people who are not like the norm – referring to patients who responded with no pain 
to surgical procedures and with pain to touch. Results of the fMRI showed that 
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whether or not people respond to pain in the way oneself does, when observing them 
in pain the ACC, MCC and the anterior insula were activated. However, when 
observing patients, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, which is associated with self-
other distinction, and the right inferior frontal cortex, which is associated with 
cognitive control, were also activated - suggesting executive functions regulating 
affective responses when observing people who are not like oneself.  
 
Motor Components of Empathy 
 
Motor components of empathy for pain are the motor cortices and the cerebellum 
which are most commonly assessed with TMS, as well as EEG. Avenanti et al.  
(2005) used TMS to record changes in corticospinal motor representations when 
observing needles painfully penetrating hands or feet. They found a reduction of 
motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) which was specific to the observed penetrated 
muscle. This inhibition correlated with the intensity of pain ascribed to the observed 
person, was increased in participants with high trait cognitive empathy, and decreased 
in participants with high trait personal distress (Avenanti, Minio-Paluello, Bufalari & 
Aglioto, 2009).  
 
Somatosensory Components of Empathy 
 
Somatosensory components of empathy for pain are the somatosensory cortex I (SI), 
the somatosensory cortex II (SII), the (posterior) insular cortex and the thalamus 
(Price, 2000) which are most commonly assessed with EEG and MEG, but also with 
fMRI. Keysers, Wicker, Gazzola, Anton, Fogassi and Gallese (2004) found that both 
when being touched and when observing someone or something else being touched 
by objects resulted in fMRI activation of the SII but not SI. In contrast, Jackson et al. 
(2005) failed to find activation in SI and SII in their study using fMRI. Bastiaansen, 
et al. (2009) argue that the reason that about half of fMRI studies found activity in the 
SI and the SII and half did not, is that besides problems with sample size, 
experimental design and analysis, it could simply be the case that fMRI is not 
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sensitive enough of a method to measure the very early occurring activation in SI and 
SII. In line with this, Lamm, Decety and Singer (2011) found in a meta-analysis that 
only picture-based paradigms (which describe visual displays of others in painful 
situations) but not cue-based paradigms (which describe cues that signal the 
participant that oneself or a nearby target person is receiving a painful stimulation)  
activated somatosensory areas. 
 
However, several EEG studies which employed different methods and smart 
experimental designs successfully revealed somatosensory resonance during empathy 
for pain. For example, using EEG, Bufalari, Aprile, Avenanti, Di Russo and Aglioti 
(2007) measured somatosensory evoked potentials (SEPs) by non-painful electrical 
stimulation of the right median nerve at the wrist while participants watched videos 
of hands being penetrated by a needle, hands being touched by a Q-tip, or hands not 
being stimulated. Their results demonstrated that the P45, a positive component, 
which occurs about 45 ms after the electrical stimulation and reflects the activity of 
SI, increased when observing others in pain and decreased when observing others 
being touched. Also, using MEG Cheng et al. (2008) were able to look at 
somatosensory oscillations by non-painfully stimulating the left median nerve. The 
quantified post-stimulus rebounds of the 10 Hz somatosensory oscillations were more 
suppressed when observing pictures of painful situations than when observing 
pictures of non-painful situations. The next chapter will describe the rather new 
method of event-related desynchronization when measuring somatosensory 
desynchronization during empathy for pain. 
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1.2.4 Somatosensory Event-Related Desynchronization 
(ERD) and Synchronization (ERS) during Empathy for 
Pain  
 
Since the analysis of somatosensory desynchronization by the event-related 
desynchronization method (Pfurtscheller & Aranibar, 1977) is employed for the 
experiment of this thesis, it is introduced here in more detail: 
 
“Brief somatosensory stimuli are followed by amplitude decreases (event-
related desynchronization, ERD) of the 10 and 20 Hz oscillations over the 
bilateral primary sensorimotor cortices, and by poststimulus synchronization 
(event-related synchronization, ERS) of the 20 Hz oscillations in the 
contralateral primary sensorimotor cortex and in the supplementary motor 
area (SMA)” (Stancák, 2006, p.237). 
 
In line with his experimental results, Stancák (2006) states that the 10 Hz and 20 Hz 
ERD distinguishes between painful and not painful somatosensory stimuli. He 
proposes that the post-stimulus 20 Hz ERS is likely to represent an inhibition of the 
motor cortex. Interestingly, he also points out that stimulation of different fingers 
produces somatosensory ERD showing a somatotopic organization. However, he also 
highlights that increased stimulation causes habituation and decreased ERD and ERS. 
Most importantly, Stancák (2006) concludes that since somatosensory ERD and ERS 
are easily influenced by cognitive processes such as anticipation, action viewing and 
imagination, they resemble top-down rather than bottom up cortical processes and 
should be attributed to preparedness in particular somatosensory channels. 
 
Whitmarsh et al. (2011) compared the three studies that have analyzed ERD and ERS 
in response to  somatosensory pain stimuli without any electrical stimulation on body 
parts of the participants - one was by Mu, Fan, Mao and Han (2008), one by Yang, 
Decety, Lee, Chen and Cheng (2008) and one by Perry, Bentin, Bartal, Lamm and 
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Decety (2010). They concluded several important intricacies one has to pay attention 
to when designing experiments measuring somatosensory desynchronization during 
empathy for pain (see Table 1): 
 
1. Whitmarsh et al. (2011) suggest that one reason Mu et al. (2008) found 
reduced alpha suppression (see table 1) but Yang et al (2008) and Perry et al 
(2010) found increased alpha suppression is that “volume conduction makes it 
difficult to separate sensorimotor alpha (or mu-rhythm) from posterior alpha 
sources in EEG scalp recordings” (Whitmarsh, 2006, p. 2). 
2. Whitmarsh et al. (2011) criticize that Yang et al. (2008) and Perry et al. 
(2010) analyzed time windows that might have been confounded by stimulus-
onset evoked responses because both calculated alpha suppression with time 
intervals starting at stimulus onset. Whitmarsh et al. (2011) point out that they 
believe one should analyze alpha suppression for later time windows. Indeed 
Mu at al. (2008) performed analyses for separate time windows and found that 
alpha suppression is modulated only between 200 and 400 ms after stimulus 
onset - which, however, might have still been confounded by transients of 
stimulus offset because their pictures were only presented for 200 ms (see 
table 1). 
3. Whitmarsh et al. (2010) assume that Mu et al.´s (2008) results might have 
been confounded by an interaction between somatosensory desynchronization 
and a certain motor-preparation which was likely to come from the 
participants task to evaluate every stimulus. 
 
Whitmarsh (2011) et al conducted a study which addressed all the shortcomings of 
these three studies: They used MEG and a beamformer technique allowing source 
localization, they restricted their statistical analyses to the non-evoked period 400 ms 
after stimulus onset, and their participants watched pain stimuli in a passive way that 
required no motor responses. Whitmarsh et al.´s (2011) results showed an increased 
alpha suppression being in line with Yang et al.´s (2008) and Perry et al.´s (2010) 
results, but contradicting Mu et al. (2008), (see Table 1). 
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Table 1 
Studies analyzing Alpha Desynchronization during Empathy for Pain without 
employing Electrical Somatosensory Stimulation 
Study Stimuli Analysis Results 
 
Mu, Fan, 
Mao & Han, 
2008 
 
800-1600 ms 
fixation cross 
(baseline) 
 
200 ms 
picture 
(conditions) 
 
Time-Frequency Analysis 
comparing 200 ms pre-
stimulus (baseline) to five 
consecutive time windows of 
200 ms from 0-1000 ms post-
stimulus (conditions) 
 
Less alpha (9-11 Hz) 
suppression at 
200-400 ms 
(frontal, central), 
 
 
Yang, 
Decety, Lee, 
Chen & 
Cheng, 
2008 
 
300 -600 ms 
fixation cross 
(baseline) 
 
1400-1700 ms 
picture 
(conditions) 
 
Time-Frequency Analysis 
comparing 200 ms pre-
stimulus (baseline) to 0-1300 
ms post-stimulus (conditions) 
 
More alpha (8-13 Hz) 
suppression 
(central) 
 
Perry, 
Bentin, 
Bartal, 
Lamm & 
Decety, 
2010 
 
2000 ms 
fixation cross 
(baseline) 
 
2000 ms 
picture 
(conditions) 
 
Time-Frequency Analysis 
comparing 500 ms pre-
stimulus (baseline) to 0-2000 
ms post-stimulus (conditions) 
 
More alpha (8-12 Hz) 
suppression 
(frontal, central) 
 
Whitmarsh, 
Nieuwenhuis, 
Barendregt & 
Jensen, 
2011 
 
1500 ms  
fixation cross 
(baseline) 
 
1500 ms 
picture, 
(conditions) 
 
Time-Frequency Analysis 
comparing 200 ms pre-
stimulus (baseline) over 
whole post-stimulus interval 
(conditions), but restricted 
statistical analysis to non-
evoked period (>400 ms) 
 
More alpha (7-14 Hz) 
suppression at > 400 ms 
(central) 
 
Note. While Mu et al. (2008) found less alpha suppression during empathy for pain, 
Yang et al. (2008), Perry et al. (2010) as well as Whitmarsh et al. (2011) found more 
alpha suppression during empathy for pain. I created this table for the purpose of this 
thesis.
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1.3 Empathy, Racial Group Membership and 
Familiarity 
 
1.3.1 Relationship between Empathy and Racial Bias 
 
The aim of this thesis is not only to explore intricacies of somatosensory resonance 
during empathy for pain, but also how this might be modulated by factors such as 
racial bias or familiarity with the target being in pain. Before going into detail and 
discussing specific studies which have assessed racial bias modulating affective and 
motor components of empathy for pain, it is necessary to define racial bias. 
Surprisingly, no unrestrictedly accepted definition of racial bias exists in the social 
psychology literature. Greenwald, McGee and Schwartz (1998) define racial bias in 
the context of their Implicit Association Task: They describe most people, including 
those with black-colored skin, as having an implicit bias to favor white-colored 
people - measured as stronger associations between White faces and positive words 
or associations between Black faces and negative words, and weaker associations 
between White faces and negative words or associations between Black faces and 
positive words. Similarly, the widely established social-psychological cross-race 
effect or cross-race bias (Meissner & Brigham, 2001) proposes a better recognition 
and processing of faces that belong to one’s own race as compared to faces that 
belong to other races. Hence, a generalization of these paradigms would be that racial 
bias can be defined as more positive and enhanced reactions to members of one’s 
own race as compared to members of other races. 
 
Many explanations for why one can have a racial bias have been found in the last 
decades. In his pioneering work “The Nature of Prejudice” of 1954 Allport proposes 
the theory that racial bias can be explained through the general phenomenon of group 
membership. He defines an ‘in-group’ as “any cluster of people who can use the term 
`we´ with the same significance” (Allport, 1954, p. 37). One can belong to many in-
groups, for instance: one’s family, one’s neighborhood, one’s city, one’s state, one’s 
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nation, one’s racial stock or mankind in general. Allport concludes, the larger the 
circle of inclusion, the fewer personal contact and the in-group potency of 
membership (Allport, 1954). Allport also philosophizes about the nature of out-
groups. He says “every line, fence, or boundary marks off an inside from an outside. 
Therefore, in strict logic, an in-group always implies the existence of some 
corresponding out-group. But this logical statement by itself is of little significance. 
What we need to know is whether one’s loyalty to the in-group automatically implies 
disloyalty, or hostility, or other forms of negativism, towards out-groups” (Allport, 
1954, p. 41). Pettigrew responded with his article “The Ultimate Attribution Error: 
Extending Allport´s Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice” (Pettigrew, 1979): He 
hypothesized that one is more likely to attribute a negative act by an out-group 
member as compared to a negative act by an in-group member dispositionally rather 
than caused by the situational context. Whereas, a positive act by an out-group 
member as compared to the same act by an in-group member is more likely to be 
attributed to “(a) the exceptional case, (b) luck or special advantage, (c) high 
motivation and effort, (d) manipulable situational context” (Pettigrew, 1979, p. 461). 
Hence, group membership seems to lead to positivism towards one’s in-group and 
negativism towards one’s out-group. A logical deduction is that one has more 
empathy for in-group members as compared to out-group members because one 
experiences more favoritism and identification with one’s in-group while having 
developed a more negative attitude towards out-groups. 
 
A relationship between empathy and group membership also makes sense when 
reminding oneself about the evolutionary perspective. As outlined in “1.1.3 
Evolutionary Functions of Empathy” of this thesis, being able to understand the 
emotions of others by empathizing allows oneself to live in social groups and benefit 
from the evolutionary advantages that this brings with it - such as being safer from 
predators and danger, being cared for from birth by other members of the group and 
having rewarding emotions of affiliation and love for others. Hence, one also might 
assume that in the past having a racial bias also had the evolutionary advantage of 
being cared for by one’s own social group and protected against other rival groups. 
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In fact, more recent articles support Allport and Pettigrew’s ideas about there being 
more favoritism for in-groups than for out-groups. For instance, Krill and Platek 
(2009) found that participants show greater ACC activation and express greater 
distress for social exclusion by same-race faces relative to other-race faces. This also 
explains why Yabar et al. (2006) measured increased patterns of mimicry when non-
Christians observed faces of non-Christians than when they observed faces of 
Christians, which implies that one tries to affiliate more with in-group members, 
possibly in order to strengthen social bonds within one’s in-group. The extent to 
which the general phenomenon of group membership is able to moderate empathy for 
in-group and out-group members can be seen when looking at a study by Stürmer et 
al. (2006). They proposed an ‘empathy x group moderation hypothesis’ and assessed 
whether participants showed greater helping intentions when the target was 
categorized as an in-group member and not an out-group member. In fact, they found 
that German and Muslim students were more inclined to help an in-group member 
with an apartment search than to help an out-group member. What was most 
surprising though was that they replicated their experiment employing not the 
culturally clearly defined groups of Germans and Muslims but employing merely 
laboratory-created groups of ‘detailed’ or ‘global’ perceivers in a random dot-
estimation task. Even though all participants were assigned to the group of detailed 
perceivers and had no contact with other members of this seemingly unimportant 
group, they again displayed greater distress and helping behavior for in-group 
members than for out-group members. If one already shows greater empathy for such 
meaningless and fictitious groups, it becomes clear that racial group membership 
modulating empathy is even more possible. 
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1.3.2 Racial Group Membership modulating Affective 
and Motor Components of Empathy for Pain 
 
So far, to our knowledge, it has only been investigated whether racial bias modulates 
affective or (sensori-) motor components of empathy for pain but not whether it also 
modulates somatosensory components. 
 
The one study which has assessed racial bias modulating affective components of 
empathy for pain has been conducted by Xu et al. (2009). They demonstrated that 
racial group membership modulates empathic neural responses. The activation in the 
ACC, when Caucasians and Chinese watched video clips of faces being painfully 
pricked by needles, was significantly lower when observing faces of other races as 
compared to faces of one’s own race. 
 
Several studies have assessed racial bias modulating (sensori-) motor components of 
empathy. Avenanti et al. (2010) found an inhibition of MEPs for both Black and 
White participants only when observing hands of in-group members but not of out-
group members being penetrated by needles. This effect correlated with the implicit 
racial bias measured by the Implicit Association Test (IAT) by Greenwald et al. 
(1998). In a similar study Gutsell and Inzlicht (2010) showed by recording mu 
rhythms measured with EEG that participants displayed activity over the motor 
cortex when watching in-group members reach for a glass and when performing the 
same action oneself, but not when observing out-group members. This effect 
correlated with the symbolic racism scale (SRS) by Henry and Sears (2002), an 
explicit measurement for racial bias. 
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1.3.3 Relationship between Empathy, Racial Group 
Membership and Familiarity 
 
Avenanti et al. (2010) correctly pointed out that when studying the relationship 
between empathy and racial bias, one also has to consider the factor of familiarity as 
a possible moderator variable. Avenanti et al. (2010) argued that the lesser empathic 
neural response for out-groups than for in-groups might not be caused by racial bias 
but could also simply stem from less familiarity with out-groups. This hypothesis is 
based on the “mere exposure effect” by Zajonc (1968) which proposes that one tends 
to favor symbols, objects or people over others simply because one has had more 
exposure to them and therefore is more familiar with them. For example, in a typical 
mere exposure experiment, participants show higher ratings of familiarity, 
recognition and preference for objects with higher exposure frequency (see Bornstein, 
1989, for a meta-analysis). 
 
In order to test their hypothesis Avenanti et al. (2010) came up with an extra-ordinary 
smart design including two experiments: In their first experiment, they presented their 
White and Black participants videos showing hands of racial in- and out-group 
members which were either penetrated by a needle (pain condition) or merely 
touched a Q-tip (touch condition). The results demonstrated that the MEP amplitude 
(calculated by subtracting the touch condition from the pain condition) was positive 
for out-group members and negative for in-group members. This indicates higher 
empathic sensori-motor contagion for in-groups than for out-groups and therefore 
suggests that racial bias modulates motor components of empathy. However, this 
result did not control for the factor of familiarity which could be a possible moderator 
variable of the relationship between empathy and racial bias. Hence, in their second 
experiment, they created a third group of stimuli consisting of videos in which the 
hands from the first experiment were digitally colored violet. The results of how 
familiar participants judged the stimuli showed that indeed the violet stimuli were 
judged as very unfamiliar (Figure 4a). In other words, this means that their 
experimental manipulation has worked. Interestingly, participant’s judgments showed 
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that they are almost equally familiar with stimuli showing in-groups or out-groups 
(Figure 4a). One could conclude that this behavioral result alone is proof enough that 
the factor of familiarity does not play a role for the main research question. However, 
participants can easily lie in behavioral designs. Only the inclusion of a third group 
allows a conclusion in neuroscientific designs. As the results showed, the MEP 
amplitude was the most suppressed for the racial in-group, followed by the violet out-
group, followed by the racial out-group (Figure 4b). Therefore, unfamiliarity cannot 
be the only factor causing the low MEP amplitude for the racial out-group; racial bias 
also contributes to the overall effect. 
 
 
Figure 4. Results from Avenanti et al.´s (2010) study. 
(A) Subjective ratings (visual analog scale, VAS) of visual familiarity of the observed 
hand with respect to one’s own hand. 
(B) MEP difference (pain - touch) in the subgroup of onlookers tested during 
observation of in-group, out-group, and extremely unfamiliar violet models, recorded 
in the target FDI muscle. 
From “Racial Bias Reduces Empathic Sensorimotor Resonance with Other-Race 
Pain”, by Avenanti et al., 2010, p. 1021. Reprinted with the first author’s permission. 
 
As one might notice from Avenanti et al.´s (2010) results, it cannot be concluded to 
what extent racial bias and to what extent familiarity caused the MEP amplitude for 
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the racial out-group to be lower. This is mostly so because one cannot defend the 
assumption that the effect of racial bias and familiarity on empathy for pain are 
independent from each other. In other words, apart from the effect of racial bias on 
empathy and the effect of familiarity on empathy, there might also be an interaction 
between familiarity and racial bias. In what way racial bias and familiarity interact is 
not clear: One could argue that more familiarity and contact with a racial out-group 
decreases racial bias, but it could just as much enhance racial bias. In conclusion, 
more research is needed to disentangle the relationship between racial bias and 
familiarity. Nonetheless, Avenanti et al. (2010) were able to show that the results 
from their first experiment, claiming that motor components of empathy for pain are 
modulated by racial bias, were supported by the results of their second experiment, 
which demonstrated that the changes in MEP amplitudes were not only caused by 
familiarity, but racial bias as well. 
 
On a different note, when assessing the relationship between racial bias and 
familiarity, one must also always keep in mind in what country the experiment takes 
place. Many experiments on stereotypes and prejudice against Black Americans are 
conducted in the United States of America in which the population of Black residents 
made up 13.6 percent of the total population in 2009 (United States Census Bureau of 
the American government). In Italy - where Avenanti et al. (2010) conducted their 
study - Black residents only made up approximately 1.53 percent of the total 
population in 2009 (Italian National Institute of Statistics). In Austria - where the 
experiment of this thesis was conducted - Black residents made up only about 0.5 
percent of the total population in 2010 (Annual report about Black people in Austria). 
Depending on how big the percentage of a group in one country is, surely the 
familiarity with members of that group varies for the rest of the population. Of 
course, other factors such as the national history of racism or current immigration and 
integration policies also matter. In conclusion, conducting experiments about 
stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination in as many countries as possible is 
important, but one has to be careful to not generalize results without also assessing 
the factor of familiarity. 
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2. DESIGN 
 
2.1. Research Question 
 
The research question for this thesis is the following: “Is alpha desynchronization 
during empathy for pain modulated by racial group membership?” Three aspects 
explaining the motivation to investigate this research question are worth pointing out: 
 
1. Although studies have assessed whether racial bias modulates affective 
components of empathy for pain measured with fMRI (Xu et al., 2009) and 
motor components of empathy for pain measured with TMS (Avenanti et al., 
2010), to our knowledge no study has yet assessed whether racial bias 
modulates somatosensory components during empathy for pain. We argue that 
the alpha desynchronization we measure with EEG can be interpreted as 
somatosensory alpha desynchronization, because our pain stimuli are 
somatosensory in their nature, because we mainly find somatosensory 
desynchronization in a time interval in which no motion is present in our 
stimuli and because other research from our field also defend interpretations 
of suppressed somatosensory oscillations and somatosensory 
desynchronization (Stancák, 2006; Cheng et al., 2008; Whitmarsh, et al., 
2011). 
2. Moreover, we intend to explore the relationship between empathy, racial bias 
and familiarity on a wider scope than it was ever researched before: We assess 
three levels with EEG measurements, with questionnaires as well as with 
behavioral experiments. 
3. Finally, we employ a state of the art EEG analysis - namely time frequency 
analysis assessing alpha desynchronization. In doing so, we also mind 
Whitmarsh et al.´s (2011) findings and therefore our participants watch pain 
stimuli in a passive way that requires no motor responses, and we analyze two 
different time intervals post-stimulus. 
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2.2 Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
In order to address the research question, two EEG sessions were held. During the 
first EEG session White participants watched videos of White and Black hands either 
being penetrated by a needle or being slightly touched by a Q-tip, while during the 
second EEG session White participants watched videos of violet colored White and 
violet colored Black hands being penetrated by a needle or being slightly touched by 
a Q-tip. Why we included violet colored hands as a third stimuli group is explained in 
great detail in the chapter 1.4 “Empathy, Racial Bias and Familiarity”; in short: By 
including a group of stimuli such as very unfamiliar violet colored hands one is able 
to control whether participants showed more alpha desynchronization during empathy 
for pain for racial in-group members than for out-group members because they indeed 
have a racial bias and not because they only have less familiarity with racial out-
group members. 
 
Our design differs slightly from Avenanti et al.´s (2010) design in the numbers of 
participants being employed for each of the two sessions. Avenanti et al. (2010) 
tested 18 Caucasian and 18 Black participants in the first session showing White and 
Black hands. For the second session, showing violet colored White and violet colored 
Black hands, they invited eight participants from the first session to again come to 
their laboratory. We think that the participants from Avenanti et al.´s (2010) study 
might have been able to guess that the hands from the second session merely are the 
violet colored White and Black hands from the first session which would make the 
experimental manipulation of creating a truly new and unfamiliar violet group of 
stimuli questionable. Therefore, we opted for a design in which different participants 
are tested in the first and second session. Further discussions about preferable large 
group sizes resulted in the decision that we would rather test a large sample of White 
participants than two smaller samples of White and Black participants. Hence, we 
tested 37 White participants during the first session and 32 White participants during 
the second session. 
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Hence, the dependent and independent variables of the EEG experiment are as 
follows (see Table 2): 
 
● The dependent variable is constitued by alpha desynchronization 
(opperationalized by ERD measured in the alpha range of 7 – 14 Hz). 
● The first independent within-subject variable “empathy for pain” is 
subdivided in the two categories pain (operationalized by videos of hands 
being penetrated by a needle) and no pain (operationalized by videos of hands 
being touched by a Q-tip). 
● The second independent within-subject variable “race” is subdivided in the 
two categories White (operationalized by videos of hands from White people) 
and Black (operationalized by videos of hands from Black people). 
The between-subject variable “familiarity” is subdivided in the two categories 
familiar original colored (operationalized by videos of hands of White and 
Black people shown in their actual color, collected in the first session) and 
unfamiliar violet colored (operationalized by videos of hands of White and 
Black people colored in violet, from the second session). 
 
 
Note. The within-subject factor “empathy for pain” is subdivided in the two 
categories pain and no pain, the within-subject factor “race” is subdivided in the two 
categories White and Black, the between-subject factor “familiarity” is subdivided in 
the two categories original colored and violet colored. 
Table 2 
Eight Experimental Conditions for the Three Factors Empathy for Pain, Race and 
Familiarity 
 
 
Familiarity 
White 
 
    Pain                    No Pain 
Black 
 
    Pain                   No Pain 
Original Color 
Violet Color 
1st Condition       2nd Condition 
5th Condition       6th Condition 
3rd Condition       4th Condition 
7th Condition       8th Condition 
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Furthermore, similar to Perry et al. (2010) we determined twelve regions of interest 
(ROIs) analyzing only data from electrodes that fell into these regions (see Figure 5). 
This scheme leads to two more variables which have to be regarded during the 
statistical analysis: 
● The independent within-subject variable “area” is subdivided in the four 
categories frontal (operationalized by electrodes over the frontal region), 
central (operationalized by electrodes over the central region), parietal 
(operationalized by electrodes over the parietal region) and occipital 
(operationalized by electrodes over the occipital region). 
● The independent within-subject variable “side” is subdivided in the three 
categories left (operationalized by electrodes over the left hemisphere), middle 
(operationalized by electrodes on the central side) and right (operationalized 
by electrodes over the right hemisphere). 
 
 
Figure 5. Twelve regions of interest from which data will be analyzed. This results in 
four areas (frontal, central, parietal and occipital) as well as three sides (left, middle, 
right) being assessed. 
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2.3 Hypotheses for Behavioral Measurements  
  
Hypothesis for Empathy for Pain of EEG Stimuli 
  
Participants were asked to rate the EEG stimuli in regard to how painful the situation 
was for the person whose hand was penetrated by a needle or touched by a Q-tip, and 
how unpleasant it was for them to watch the situation. 
  
The first hypothesis (H1) is that the ratings of painfulness and unpleasantness are 
higher for pain than for no pain. 
  
Since we assume that participants would be more aroused when observing a hand 
being penetrated by a needle than being touched by a Q-tip - independent of whether 
they observe original colored White, original colored Black, violet colored White or 
violet colored Black stimuli, the hypothesis is formulated as a directed hypothesis. 
This hypothesis has been supported by numerous studies investigating empathy for 
pain (for example Yang et al., 2008; Perry et al., 2010; Whitmarsh et al., 2011). 
  
Hypothesis for Race of EEG Stimuli 
  
The second hypothesis (H2) is that the ratings of painfulness and unpleasantness are 
higher for White than for Black. 
  
Since we assume that due to racial group membership White participants would be 
more aroused when observing White stimuli than when observing Black stimuli - 
independent of whether they observe pain or no pain stimuli, the hypothesis is 
formulated as a directed hypothesis.  This difference should be found when looking at 
original colored White and original colored Black stimuli. When looking at violet 
colored White and violet colored Black stimuli the suppression should be similar. 
44 
Hypothesis for Empathy for Pain x Race Interaction of EEG 
Stimuli  
  
The third hypothesis (H3) is that the ratings of painfulness and unpleasantness are 
higher for original colored White, violet colored White and violet colored Black than 
for original colored Black. 
  
According to Avenanti et al.´s (2010) results, White participants demonstrated higher 
ratings of painfulness and unpleasantness of the EEG stimuli for their racial in-group 
than for their racial out-group. If the factor of familiarity does not play a role for the 
interaction between empathy for pain and race, then White participants would show 
similar ratings for original colored White, violet colored White and violet colored 
Black but less for original colored Black. 
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2.4 Hypotheses for Correlations between 
Painfulness and Unpleasantness of EEG 
Stimuli 
  
Hypothesis for Correlation between Painfulness and 
Unpleasantness of EEG Stimuli and Prosocial Behavior 
  
For the ratings of painfulness and unpleasantness a score was calculated by 
subtracting the difference of original or violet colored Black pain minus original or 
violet colored Black no pain from the difference of original or violet colored White 
pain minus original or violet colored White no pain. 
  
In response to a picture of an original or violet colored White and original or violet 
colored Black hand, participants were asked whether they would be willing to help 
prepare letters that would be sent out to gather donations for these patients. We 
assume that the measure of prosocial behavior should correlate with ratings of 
painfulness and unpleasantness of the EEG stimuli in a directed way. 
  
The 4th hypothesis (H4) is that the higher the ratings of painfulness and 
unpleasantness (calculated by subtracting the difference of original or violet colored 
Black pain minus original or violet colored Black no pain from the difference of 
original or violet colored White pain minus original or violet colored White no pain), 
the higher prosocial behavior. 
 
Hypothesis for Correlation between Painfulness and 
Unpleasantness of EEG Stimuli and Explicit Empathy  
 
A score for the ratings of painfulness and unpleasantness was calculated by subtract-   
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ing no pain from pain, because the paradigm empathy for pain is defined as the 
difference between pain and no pain. 
  
The 5th hypothesis (H5) is that there is relationship between empathy for pain based 
on the ratings of painfulness and unpleasantness (calculated by subtracting no pain 
from pain) and one’s explicit empathic traits (perspective taking abilities, one’s 
ability to identify with others, one’s empathic concern and one’s personal distress 
when observing others in need). 
  
The hypothesis is tested as a directed (one-tailed) hypothesis because as empathy for 
pain based on the ratings of painfulness and unpleasantness increases, so too should 
explicit empathy assessed by a questionnaire. 
  
Hypothesis for Correlation between Painfulness and 
Unpleasantness of EEG Stimuli and Implicit and Explicit 
Racial Bias 
  
A racial bias score for empathy for pain based on the ratings of painfulness and 
unpleasantness was calculated by subtracting the difference of original colored Black 
pain minus original colored Black no pain from the difference of original colored 
White pain minus original colored White no pain. 
  
The 6th hypothesis (H6) is that there is a relationship between the racial bias based on 
ratings of painfulness and unpleasantness of the EEG stimuli (calculated by 
subtracting the difference of original colored Black pain minus original colored 
Black no pain from the difference of original colored White pain minus original 
colored White no pain) and implicit and explicit racial bias. 
  
As the racial bias based on ratings of painfulness and unpleasantness of the EEG 
stimuli increases, implicit and explicit racial bias should as well. This is why the 
hypothesis is tested as a directed (one-tailed) hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis for Correlation between Painfulness and 
Unpleasantness of EEG Stimuli and Familiarity 
  
The 7th hypothesis (H7) is that there is a relationship between the racial bias based on 
ratings of painfulness and unpleasantness of the EEG stimuli (calculated by 
subtracting the difference of original colored Black pain minus original colored 
Black no pain from the difference of original colored White pain minus original 
colored White no pain) and explicit familiarity. 
  
The hypothesis is tested as an undirected (two-tailed) hypothesis because familiarity 
with Blacks could be related to an increased or decreased racial bias based on ratings 
of painfulness and unpleasantness of the EEG stimuli (see “1.3.3 Relationship 
between Empathy, Racial Bias and Familiarity”). 
  
Hypothesis for Correlation between Painfulness and 
Unpleasantness of EEG Stimuli and Social Desirable 
Responding 
  
The 8th hypothesis (H8) is that there is a relationship  between the racial bias based 
on ratings of painfulness and unpleasantness of the EEG stimuli (calculated by 
subtracting the difference of original colored Black pain minus original colored 
Black no pain from the difference of original colored White pain minus original 
colored White no pain) and social desirable responding. 
  
The hypothesis is tested as a directed (one-tailed) hypothesis because we assume that 
if one responds in a social desirable way, then one should show less racial bias.  
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2.5 Hypotheses for EEG Measurements 
 
Empathy for Pain - Hypothesis 
 
The 9th hypothesis (H9), the “Empathy for Pain - Hypothesis”, is that more alpha 
desynchronization is found for pain than for no pain. 
 
Further, we hypothesize that this interaction reveals itself in somatosensory 
desynchronization and therefore it should be significant in central areas and maybe 
also in parietal, but not in frontal and occipital areas. Also, since participants watched 
stimuli showing right hands, this interaction should be even stronger over the left 
hemisphere than over the right hemisphere due to lateralized resonance. 
 
The hypothesis is formulated as a directed hypothesis, because we assume that 
participants would be more empathic resonance when observing a hand being 
penetrated by a needle than being touched by a Q-tip - independent from whether 
they observe original colored White, original colored Black, violet colored White or 
violet colored Black stimuli. This hypothesis has been supported by numerous studies 
investigating empathy for pain (for example Yang et al., 2008; Perry et al., 2010; 
Whitmarsh et al., 2011). 
 
Race - Hypothesis 
 
The 10th hypothesis (H10), the “Race - Hypothesis”, is that more alpha 
desynchronization is found for White than for Black. 
 
Further, we hypothesize that this interaction difference varies between the areas. 
Also, since participants watched stimuli showing right hands, this interaction should 
be even stronger over the left hemisphere than over the right hemisphere due to 
lateralized resonance. 
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The hypothesis is formulated as a directed hypothesis, because we assume that due to 
racial group membership White participants would be more aroused when observing 
White stimuli than when observing observing Black stimuli - independent from 
whether they observe pain or no pain stimuli. This difference should be found when 
looking at original colored White and original colored Black stimuli. When looking 
at violet colored White and violet colored Black stimuli the suppression should be 
similar. 
 
Empathy for Pain x Race - Hypothesis 
 
The 11th hypothesis (H11), the “Empathy for Pain x Race - Hypothesis”, is that the 
difference in alpha suppression of pain minus no pain is stronger for original colored 
White, violet colored White and violet colored Black than for original colored Black. 
 
Further, we hypothesize that this interaction reveals itself in somatosensory resonance 
and therefore it should be significant in central areas and maybe also in parietal but 
not in frontal and occipital areas. Also, since participants watched stimuli showing 
right hands, this interaction should be even stronger even stronger over the left 
hemisphere than over the right hemisphere due to lateralized resonance. 
 
The direction of this hypothesis is based on Avenanti et al.´s (2010) results and 
represents that White participants show more empathy for their racial in-group than 
for their racial out-group. If the factor of familiarity does not play a role for the 
interaction between empathy for pain and race, then White participants show similar 
empathy for pain for original colored White, violet colored White and violet colored 
Black but less for original colored Black.  
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2.6 Hypotheses for Correlations between EEG 
and Behavioral Measurements  
 
Hypothesis for Correlation between EEG Measurement and 
Evaluations assessing EEG Stimuli 
 
Alpha desynchronization measured with EEG was calculated by subtracting the 
difference of original or violet colored Black pain minus original or violet colored 
Black no pain from the difference of original or violet colored White pain minus 
original or violet colored White no pain. Since we hypothesize that this alpha 
suppression measured with EEG reveals itself in somatosensory alpha 
desynchronization, calculations were focused on data gathered from the central area 
on the left side. 
 
The 12th hypothesis (H12) is that there is a relationship between the alpha 
desynchronization measured with EEG (calculated by subtracting the difference of 
original or violet colored Black pain minus original or violet colored Black no pain 
from the difference of original or violet colored White pain minus original or violet 
colored White no pain) and the score for the evaluations of the EEG stimuli 
(calculated by subtracting the difference of original or violet colored Black pain 
minus original or violet colored Black no pain from the difference of original or 
violet colored White pain minus original or violet colored White no pain). 
 
The hypothesis is tested as a directed (one-tailed) hypothesis, because both EEG and 
behavioral measurements are assessing exactly the same stimuli. Therefore when one 
score increases, the other one should, too. 
 
We assume that the measure of prosocial behavior should correlate with alpha 
suppression measured with EEG in a direct way: 
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The 13th hypothesis (H13) is that there is a relationship between alpha suppression 
measured with EEG (calculated by subtracting the difference of original or violet 
colored Black pain minus original or violet colored Black no pain from the 
difference of original or violet colored White pain minus original or violet colored 
White no pain) and prosocial behavior. 
 
Hypothesis for Correlation between EEG Measurement and 
Explicit Empathy 
 
A score for the EEG measurements was calculated by subtracting no pain from pain 
because the paradigm empathy for pain is defined as the difference between pain and 
no pain. 
 
The 14th hypothesis (H14) is that there is relationship between electrophysiological 
empathy for pain (calculated by subtracting no pain from pain), one’s explicit 
empathic traits (perspective taking abilities, one’s ability to identify with others, 
one’s empathic concern and one’s personal distress when observing others in need). 
 
As empathy for pain assessed with EEG increases, explicit empathy assessed with 
questionnaires should, too. This is why the hypothesis is tested as a directed (one-
tailed) hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis for Correlation between EEG Measurement and 
Implicit and Explicit Racial Bias 
 
For the correlation between EEG measurements and measurements of implicit and 
explicit racial bias, a  “Electrophysiological Racial Bias” for empathy for pain was 
calculated by subtracting the difference of original colored Black pain minus original 
colored Black no pain from the difference of original colored White pain minus 
original colored White no pain. Since we hypothesize that this electrophysiological 
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racial bias reveals itself in the suppression of somatosensory alpha desynchronization, 
calculations were focused on data gathered from the central area on the left side. 
 
The 15th hypothesis (H15) is that there is a relationship between the 
electrophysiological racial bias (calculated by subtracting the difference of original 
colored Black pain minus original colored Black no pain from the difference of 
original colored White pain minus original colored White no pain) and implicit and 
explicit racial bias. 
 
We assume that higher EEG desynchronization indicated higher empathy, and 
therefore higher EEG desynchronization should be positively correlated with trait 
empathy measures 
 
Hypothesis for Correlation between EEG Measurement and 
Explicit Familiarity 
 
The 16th hypothesis (H16) is that there is a relationship between electrophysiological 
racial bias (calculated by subtracting the difference of original colored Black pain 
minus original colored Black no pain from the difference of original colored White 
pain minus original colored White no pain) and explicit familiarity. 
 
The hypothesis is tested as an undirected (two-tailed) hypothesis because familiarity 
with Blacks could be related to an increased or decreased electrophysiological racial 
bias (see “1.3.3 Relationship between Empathy, Racial Bias and Familiarity”). 
 
Hypothesis for Correlation between EEG Measurement and 
Social Desirable Responding 
 
The 17th hypothesis (H17) is that there is a relationship between electrophysiological 
racial bias (calculated by subtracting the difference of original colored Black pain 
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minus original colored Black no pain from the difference of original colored White 
pain minus original colored White no pain) and social desirable responding. 
 
The hypothesis is tested as a directed (one-tailed) hypothesis because we assume that 
if one responds in a social desirable way, then one should show less racial bias. 
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3. METHODS  
 
3.1 Participants 
 
69 White participants (37 females) aged between 19 and 36 years (M = 23.16, SD = 
3.24) participated in this study. Of these 69 participants 37 participants (20 females) 
aged between 19 and 36 years (M = 23.70, SD = 3.70) participated in the first session 
showing only original colored White and original colored Black stimuli, and the 
remaining 32 participants (17 females) aged between 19 and 30 years (M = 22.53, SD 
= 2.52) participated in the second session showing only violet colored White and 
violet colored Black stimuli. Participants received a monetary reward or a bonus for 
an university exam in biological psychology for their participation. 
 
All participants were tested at the Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience Unit 
(SCAN Unit) from the Institute of Clinical, Biological and Differential Psychology at 
the University of Vienna. 
 
All participants fulfilled the inclusion criteria for this study which are:  right handed 
according to the standard handedness inventory (Oldfield, 1971); normal or corrected 
vision; no neurological or psychiatric diseases; no hypersensitive scalp, eczema or 
birth-marks on scalp; no fractures of the scalp; no skull implants; no contagious 
blood-born diseases; no diabetes or bleeding disorders; no fear of needles; no regular 
medication use or abuse of psychotropic drugs. 
 
The study was conducted in accordance with the ethical standards for participants of 
the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. 
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3.2 Stimuli 
 
Experimental stimuli consisted of different types of video clips presented in a 18 x 22 
cm window on a black background, presented on a 50 cm computer screen 
approximately 1 m away from the participants. 
 
The video clips were created by Avenanti et al. (2010). Alessio Avenanti has given 
his permission that the stimuli could be used for this study. The videos showed one of 
the following situations: a Q-tip gently touching a White hand (White no pain 
condition, see Figure 6A); a needle deeply penetrating a White hand (White pain 
condition, see Figure 6B); a Q-tip gently touching a Black hand (Black no pain 
condition, see Figure 6D); a needle deeply penetrating a Black hand (White pain 
condition, see Figure 6E). In order to avoid an habituation effect which arises when 
participants watch the same clip many times, the color of the Q-tip and the shape of 
the syringe varied in three ways. Therefore, for each of the four conditions three types 
of videos where produced, resulting in twelve videos for the conditions. 
 
All these conditions were digitally colored violet in order to create the third and 
fourth group of stimuli, see Figure 6C showing a digitally violet colored White hand 
or Figure 6F showing a digitally violet colored Black hand. 
 
There are a few remarks one should add: First, Avenanti et al. (2010) have been 
aware of the fact that observing hands using tools causes an activation over the 
primary motor cortex (Järveläinen, Schürmann & Hari, 2004). To limit this effect, 
they prevented the presented hands from being moved in any way, and assured that 
the holder of the syringe can not be seen. Second, they used only one White model 
and one Black model whose hands they positioned in a similar manner. 
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Figure 6. Visual Stimuli for the EEG experiment. Permission for usage and slight 
modification by Avenanti et al. (2010). 
(A) original colored White no pain condition. 
(B) original colored White pain condition. 
(C) Example of a digitally violet colored White pain condition. 
(D) original colored Black no pain condition. 
(E) original colored Black pain condition. 
(F) Example of a digitally violet colored White pain condition. 
From “Racial Bias Reduces Empathic Sensorimotor Resonance with Other-Race 
Pain”, by Avenanti et al., 2010. Reprinted with permission of the first author. 
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3.3 Procedure 
 
The entire experiment, including all instructions, tests, and questionnaires, was 
conducted in German language. 
 
First, participants read and signed an “Informed Consent to Participate in an EEG 
Study” (see Appendix A). Also, they completed the “Edinburgh Inventory” (Oldfield, 
1971, see Appendix B) - an assessment of their handedness. 
 
In preparation for the EEG measurement electrodes were applied and checked, during 
which radio music was playing. This is meant to reduce boredom and foster alertness 
of the participants (Luck, 2005). Participants were guided to a sound-proof and semi-
darkened room where they sat down on a comfortable chair approximately 1 m away 
from a 50 cm computer screen (for a detailed description of this process please see 
“4.4.1 EEG Recording”). In order to reduce artifacts in the EEG data, participants 
were instructed by the experimenters to avoid looking around in the room, to focus on 
the screen, to avoid any major bodily movements, and to sit still, relax and only to 
move in one of the seven breaks. Of course, participants were also told that in the 
case of a cramp some movement to loosen muscles is advisable. Then, on the 
computer screen participants read instructions about the nature of the experiment (for 
the full EEG instructions see Appendix C). Importantly, these instructions did not 
give any information why hands were penetrated by a needle or touched by a Q-tip in 
the video clips. The reason for this is that Lamm et al. (2010) found that titling the 
hand models as patients influences the empathic response of the participants. An 
average of 50 minutes passed from the arrival of the participants to the beginning of 
the EEG recording. 
 
During the EEG recording of the first EEG session with White and Black stimuli, one 
single trial started with a fixation cross being presented for one and a half seconds. A 
video of a static hand followed for one and a half seconds. Consecutively, a video of 
three seconds showed one of four situations: 
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Figure 7. Schematic representation of EEG-sessions. 
(A) First session with original colored White and original colored Black stimuli 
(B) Second session with violet colored White stimuli and violet colored Black stimuli. 
 
A needle penetrating a original colored White hand (original colored White pain 
condition) or a original colored Black hand (original colored Black pain condition), 
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or a Q-tip touching a original colored White hand (original colored White no pain 
condition) or a original colored Black hand (original colored Black no pain 
condition). The trial ended with a fixation cross, which was presented for a randomly 
varied time interval of 0-0.5 seconds allowing an intertrial interval (ITI) that reduces 
stimulus predictability (see Figure 7). For each of the four conditions 60 videos were 
presented, resulting in 240 videos being presented during the entire EEG session. 
These 240 trials were randomly shown in eight blocks of 40 trials each. In between 
these eight blocks seven breaks were given for which the participants could decide 
when to end them and continue. The second EEG session with violet colored stimuli - 
which included different participants than the first EEG session - had the same 
experimental design but the White and Black stimuli were digitally colored violet 
(Figure 7 visualizes the experimental structure of both EEG sessions). One EEG 
session lasted for approximately 25 minutes. 
 
After the EEG recording ended, participants stayed at the computer to answer a few 
questions regarding the painfulness, unpleasantness and believability of the EEG 
stimuli (see Appendix D), their willingness to help the patients of the video (see 
Appendix E). Answering these questions took approximately 20 minutes. 
 
After participants finished these questions, the cap with electrodes was removed and 
they were guided to a bathroom where they could wash their hair. This time also 
served as a break. 
 
Importantly, participants completed the behavioral measurements alone in a room 
because many concepts which were measured could have been easily influenced by 
social factors, such as the presence of the White experimenters of this study. They 
were presented in the following order: (1) Affect Misattribution Procedure (Payne, 
Cheng, Govoron & Stewart, 2005; (2) Implicit Association Task (Greenwald, McGee 
& Schwartz, 1998, for stimuli material see Appendix G); (3) Saarbrücker 
Persönlichkeitsfragebogen (Paulus, 2009, see Appendix F); (4) White Preference 
Thermometer Difference (Project Implicit of Harvard University, 1998, see Appendix 
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H); (5) White Preference Likert (Project Implicit of Harvard University, 1998, see 
Appendix H); (6) Attitudes towards Blacks Scale (Brigham, 1993, see Appendix I); 
(7) Internal and External Motivation to Respond without Prejudice (Plant & Devine, 
1998, see Appendix J); (8) Social Experiences Questionnaire (Brigham, 1993, see 
Appendix K); (9) Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Musch, Brockhaus & 
Bröder, 2002, see Appendix L). Finally, participants provided demographic 
information concerning age, sex, race, political orientation, preferred party, religion, 
religiousness, education, major college subject, country of residence and country of 
birth (based on the demographic information from Project Implicit with the Implicit 
Association Task from Harvard University, see Appendix M). Completing all these 
measurements took approximately 40 minutes. 
 
Subsequently, participants were thanked for their participation, received a piece of 
chocolate and  informed about the research purpose of the study. Each participant was 
tested for maximal three hours, but most were finished after only two and a half 
hours. 
 
The EEG sessions were programmed with E-Prime 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools, 
Inc., Sharpsburg, USA), the Implicit Association Task and the Affect Misattribution 
Procedure was run with Inquisit 2.0.60616 (Computer software. (2006). Seattle, WA: 
Millisecond Software), and all other questionnaires were presented on the online 
questionnaire service SoSci Survey (https://www.soscisurvey.de). 
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3.4 EEG Measurements 
 
3.4.1 EEG Recording 
 
EEG signals were recorded using 64 Ag/AgCl electrodes. An elastic electrode cap 
(EASYCAP GmbH; Model M10, Herrsching, Germany) assured an equidistant 
positioning of 59 scalp electrodes according to an expansion of the 10-20 system 
(Jasper, 1958). Of these 59 electrodes, an electrode lying on the mastoid behind the 
left and one on the mastoid behind the right ear were used as reference electrodes. 
Additionally, one ground electrode was applied between the eyebrows allowing an 
grounding of the electrode system. Lastly, in order to record the electrooculogram 
(EOG) four electrodes were applied in a horizontal and vertical position to the eyes - 
two electrodes were applied in line with the iris 1 cm above and below the left eye as 
well as one electrode each 1 cm next to the outer corner of the left and right eye. The 
EOG data could later be used offline to correct artifacts due to eye movements. After 
all electrodes were applied, four steps followed with the purpose to minimize skin 
resistance and enhance conduction between scalp and electrode: (1) hair under each 
electrode was moved to the side, (2) skin under each electrode was fumigated with 70 
percent alcohol, (3) skin under each electrode was lightly scratched with a sterile one-
use needle (Picton, Bentin, Berg, Donchin, Hillyard, Johnson, Miller, Ritter, Rchkin 
& Taylor, 2000), (4) each electrode was filled with electro-gel (Electro-Cap 
International, Inc., Eaton, OH). The impedance of each electrode was checked and the 
four steps were repeated until each electrode impedance was below 2 kΩ. 
 
After these preparations, the EEG recording started in a room that was semi- 
darkened, sound proof and most importantly kept the EEG signal free of much 
electrical noise from surroundings. The EEG data was digitized at a sampling rate of 
2000 Hz, meaning that 2000 samples were recorded each second. 
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During the entire EEG recording electrode impedance were constantly monitored. If 
levels had risen above acceptable levels, breaks between experiment blocks were 
used to repeat the moving of hair, scratching of skin and filling with electrode-gel 
procedures. These were repeated until the impedance levels were appropriate again. 
 
 
3.4.2 EEG Pre-processing 
 
EEG data was analyzed offline with EEGLAB 6.03.b software (Delorme & Makeig, 
2004) integrated in MATLAB 7.5.0 software (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA). 
 
First, means of pre-processing the data were utilized: The data was re-sampled to 256 
Hz.  In order to clean the data from DC offsets and slow drifts, a highpass filter of  < 
1 Hz was used. Also, the channels were reordered and then rereferenced to the 
average of the two mastoids. 
 
Second, several steps were taken to minimize data artifacts: By visual inspection 
parts of the channel data were rejected because they showed clear artifacts caused by 
uncorrectable eye or body movements, muscle activity or unstable electrode contact. 
Also, periods in which the subject read instructions or took a break were rejected, as 
they were usually represented by distorted data segments. For some datasets, parts of 
a few particularly distorted channels had to be interpolated using spherical spline 
interpolation. The cleaner the data was after these steps, the better the following 
Independent Component Analysis (ICA) worked. The ICA is a linear decomposition 
method first applied to EEG by Makeig, Bell, Jung, Sejnowski (1996). It uses various 
spatial filters to transform the mixed signal of the original scalp channel data into 
more temporally independent component signals. This allows components 
representing artifacts to be identified and rejected (Jung, Makeig, Humphries, Lee, 
McKeown, Iragui & Sejnowski, 2000). After the ICA ran through the first time, 
definite artifacts were rejected by another visual inspection of the channel data and a 
second ICA was run. After the second ICA, three sources of information were 
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visually inspected to identify artifact components: component time courses, 
component scalp maps and component spectra. For example, a typical eye artifact 
often shows blink amplitudes in the component time course, a highlighted activation 
on the frontal side of the component scalp map, and thusly do not contribute much to 
the frequency of interest in the component spectra. In sum, after enough components 
are rejected the channel data should be relatively free of artifacts. The ICA was 
performed for each subject separately. 
 
Last, the dataset of each subject was epoched to include the last 500 ms of 1500 ms of 
the fixation cross presentation and the entire 4500 ms of the condition video 
presentation, and new datasets for the separate conditions were saved for the subjects 
individually. 
 
 
3.4.3 EEG Analysis 
 
Our analysis focuses on the event-related time-frequency measure “event-related 
spectral perturbation” (ERSP). This measure assesses event-related changes in the 
power spectrum, comparing the power spectrum of the baseline period to the power 
spectrum of the condition period, which generalizes the method of ERD and ERS 
(Pfurtscheller & Aranibar, 1979). Plots of the baseline-normalized ERSP visualize the 
power in dB at a certain frequency and certain time relative to the baseline by 
employing a specific color at each image pixel. In order to calculate the spectral 
estimate of trial k at frequency f and time t EEG lab we employed the short-time 
Fourier transform of EEG lab (Delorme & Makeig, 2004): 
  
   
(1) 
When computing the ERSP we used a number of 200 sliding latency windows each 
comparing the spectral power at frequency f and time t of the condition period to the 
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epoch mean power spectrum of the baseline. In other words, in order to produce the 
baseline-normalized ERSP the mean baseline log power spectrum is subtracted from 
each spectral estimate (Derlome et al., 2004). As baseline or epoch-mean power 
spectrum serve the 500 ms pre-stimulus which showed a fixation cross. To the 
baseline either the time window 1 (T1) of 2000-3000 ms (showing a needle or Q-Tip 
moving towards a hand) or the time window  2 (T2) of 3250-4250 ms (showing the 
hand being penetrated by a needle or touched by a Q-tip) was compared (see figure 
7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Presentation of one trial. As Baseline (B) the 500 ms pre-stimulus was used 
to which the time window 1 (T1) of 2000-3000 ms or the time window  2 (T2) of 
3250-4250 ms was compared. 
 
The ERSP was first computed for each trial, then averaged for each subject and lastly 
grand-averaged for all subjects. Finally for the following statistical analyses we 
computed the following measure: 
● ERSP for the frequency band alpha (7-14 Hz): The lower the ERSP for the 
frequency band alpha, the more alpha desynchronization. 
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3.5 Behavioral Measurements 
 
3.5.1 Measurements of Evaluations Assessing EEG 
Stimuli 
 
Measurement of Painfulness, Unpleasantness and 
Believability (see Appendix D) 
 
Participants viewed all 12 types of videos for the four conditions and were asked to 
rate on a 7-point-Likert-scale how painful the situation was for the person (whose 
hand was penetrated by a needle or touched by a Q-tip), how unpleasant it was for 
them to watch the situation, and how believable and realistic the stimuli were. 
 
Measurement of Prosocial Behavior (see Appendix E) 
 
The participants read that the videos they have just seen showed patients who suffer 
from Hyperhidrosis Palmaris. They were then asked whether they would be willing to 
help prepare letters that would be sent out to gather donations. 
 
 
3.5.2 Measurement of Explicit Empathy 
 
Saarbrücker Persönlichkeitsfragebogen (Paulus, 2009, see Appendix 
F) 
 
Even though the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) by Davis (1980) is the most 
broadly used questionnaire to assess the psychological construct of empathy, Paulus 
(2009) points out that the original English version and translated German versions 
have test-theoretical shortcomings. Therefore, Paulus (2009) developed a German 
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version of the IRI, called “Saarbrücker Persöhnlichkeitsfragebogen” (SPF), which has 
been tested through multiple factor analyses and revised until sufficient values for 
reliability, validity and item selectivity had been reached. In the final version 
participants rate 16 items on a scale ranging from 1 (“does not apply at all”) to 5 
(“applies very much”). The completion of the questionnaire takes approximately five 
minutes. 
 
The SPF has the same following four factors as the IRI (Paulus, 2009): 
● Perspective Taking (PT): The higher the score on the perspective taking scale 
is, the higher is one’s ability to spontaneously take the perspective of others 
and to see things from their point of view  - which is associated with higher 
social acceptance and self worth. The factor includes item 4, 10, 14 and 16. 
● Fantasy (FS): The higher the score on the fantasy scale is, the higher is one’s 
tendency to identify with characters from novels, plays, movies or other 
fictional works - which does not relate to social abilities or self worth but to 
greater physical and emotional arousal. The factor includes item 2, 7, 12 and 
15. 
● Empathic Concern (EC): The higher the score on the empathic concern scale 
is, the more other-oriented feelings of concern one has when observing others 
in need. The factor includes item 1, 5, 9 and 11. 
● Personal Distress (PD): The higher the score on the personal distress scale is, 
the more self-oriented feelings of distress one has when observing others in 
need. The factor includes item 3, 6, 8 and 13. 
 
While the perspective taking scale can be considered as a cognitive factor of 
empathy, the fantasy, empathic concern and personal distress scale are described as 
emotional factors of empathy (Davis, 1980).  
 
Paulus (2009) highlights that the IRI and German translations of it always reached 
reliability values between .63 and .77, but that the SPF achieved a Cronbach-alpha 
reliability of .78 and a split-half-coefficient with Spearman-Brown-correction of .80. 
70 
3.5.3 Measurements of Implicit and Explicit Racial 
Bias 
 
We employed a selection of questionnaires and tests that assess various facets of 
racial bias. First, we employed the “Affect Misattribution Procedure” (Payne, Cheng, 
Govoron & Stewart, 2005) and the Implicit Association Task (Greenwald, Mc Gee & 
Schwartz, 1998) as measurements for implicit racial bias. Even though one may 
demonstrate no explicit racial bias when answering a questionnaire - being aware and 
in control of the answers one chooses to give, one might still show an implicit racial 
bias when completing tests such as the AMP or the IAT that measure qualities of the 
way one gives answers - over which one has no conscious control. The AMP differs 
from the IAT in that it assesses implicit racial bias without relying on direct 
categorization of White and Black faces, and therefore might be a potentially good 
new test in addition to the older and established IAT. In regard to measurements for 
explicit racial bias we chose from established questionnaires these ones that measure 
racial bias in the realms of feelings such as the “Preference Likert Scale” and the 
“Feeling Thermometer” (implicit.harvard.edu), in the realms of attitudes such as the 
“Attitudes towards Blacks” questionnaire (Brigham, 1993), and in the realms of 
motivation such as the “Internal and External Motivation to Respond without 
Prejudice” (Plant & Devine, 1998). 
 
Affect Misattribution Procedure (Payne, Cheng, Govoron & 
Stewart, 2005) 
 
The AMP is based on the concept of misattribution which can be defined as 
“mistaking an effect of one source for the effect of another” (Payne et al., 2005). In 
one trial of 200 ms, participants see a picture of a White or Black face (stimulus 
pictures are the ones from the IAT, see Appendix H) or a neutral stimulus (a gray 
screen), followed by a Chinese pictograph which is also presented for 200 ms. They 
are instructed to simply regard the pictures of the White and Black faces as warning 
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signals and apart from this not to pay attention to them. Their task is to judge the 
visual pleasantness of the Chinese pictograph as pleasant or unpleasant. Payne et al. 
(2005) explain the process of misattribution by arguing that whether one judges the 
Chinese pictographs as pleasant or unpleasant mainly depends on if one was primed 
in a positive or negative way by the preceding White, Black or neutral stimuli. All 
together participants judge 72 Chinese pictographs. The completion of the test takes 
approximately five minutes. 
 
Payne et al. (2005) exclusively analyze the proportions of the pleasant responses. 
They either simply compare the proportions of the pleasant responses for the White, 
Black and neutral stimuli or they also calculate the Cohen´s effect size to also 
consider the standard deviation: 
● d AMP measure: This measure subtracts the pleasant responses for White 
stimuli from the pleasant responses for Black stimuli and divides this 
difference by the standard deviation. If one gives more pleasant responses for 
the Chinese pictographs after seeing White stimuli than after seeing Black 
stimuli then one would have a negative dAMP score, which indicates an 
implicit White bias. Therefore, the lower a negative dAMP score, the higher 
the White bias. 
 
The race AMP achieved a relatively high Cronbach-alpha reliability of .85 (Payne et 
al., 2005). 
 
Implicit Association Task (Greenwald, McGee & Schwartz, 
1998, for stimulus materials see Appendix G) 
 
An implicit attitude is defined as “introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately 
identified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, 
thought, or action toward social objects” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, p. 8). In 1998, 
Greenwald et al. published the first report about the IAT which assessed implicit 
attitudes towards insects relative to flowers. Since then, a number of IATs assessing 
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attitudes towards various concepts have been developed - one such is the Race IAT 
which includes as target concepts pictures of White and Black faces (see Appendix H 
for stimulus materials) and as attribute concepts the words good and bad. In seven 
blocks participants have to rapidly classify words in one of the following manners: 
left key for White and right key for Black (block 1), left key for good and right key 
for Black (block 2), left key for White or good and right key for Black or bad (block 
3 and 4), left key for Black and right key for White (block 5), left key for Black or 
good and right key for White or good (block 6 and 7). Participants complete the entire 
Race IAT in approximately 10 minutes. 
 
The number of correct answers is not of primary interest, but rather the reaction times 
when giving correct answers. Only the fourth and seventh block are used to calculate 
the IAT measure. Importantly, this IAT measure can actually be calculated with a 
great number of different functions. However, in regard of such matters as internal 
consistency, magnitude of implicit-explicit correlations or the effect of prior IAT 
experience, the D1 measure has proved itself to have one of the most convincing 
characteristics (Greenwald, Nosek & Banaji, 2003) and therefore will be focused on 
here: 
● D1 IAT measure: This measure divides the difference between the mean of the 
fourth block and the mean of the seventh block by the standard deviation of 
the latencies of the combined fourth and seventh block. If one shows faster 
responses in the fourth than in the seventh block, then one’s association of 
White paired with good and Black paired with bad are stronger than the 
associations of White paired with bad and Black paired with good, which 
indicates an implicit White bias. A positive score indicates a White bias; the 
higher the score, the higher the White bias. 
 
Interestingly, over 2.5 million IATs completed on public web sites showed the 
general pattern that “implicit attitudes toward culturally valued groups were shown to 
be positive; participants demonstrated, on average, greater positivity for White over 
Black, Other Peoples (non-Arab Muslims) over Arab Muslims, not -disabled versus 
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disabled, young over old, and straight over gay” (Lane, Banaji, Nosek & Greenwald, 
2007, p. 66). 
 
The IAT has a reasonable Cronbach-alpha reliability of .78 (Cunningham, Preacher & 
Banaji, 2001). 
 
White Preference Thermometer Difference (Project Implicit 
of Harvard University, 1998, see Appendix H) 
 
The Project Implicit from Harvard University (https://implicit.harvard.edu, launched 
in 1998) administered an online version of the IAT to over 15.000 voluntary 
participants weekly. Randomly before or after the IAT a few questions are asked such 
as the one item assessment “Feeling Thermometer” assessing participants feelings for 
Whites and Blacks on a 10 point scale ranging from 1 (very warm) to 10 (very cold). 
 
The measurement has two items each contributing to one factor: 
● Feelings for Blacks: This one-item measure describes the how warm or cold 
participants feel towards Blacks. The higher the score, the colder one feels 
towards Blacks. 
● Feelings for Whites: This one-item measure describes the how warm or cold 
participants feel towards Whites. The lower the score, the colder one feels 
towards Whites. 
 
White Preference Likert Scale (Project Implicit of Harvard 
University, 1998, see Appendix H) 
 
Another measure we employed from the Project Implicit from Harvard University 
(https://implicit.harvard.edu, launched in 1998) is a the one item assessment 
“Preference Likert Scale” on a 7 point Likert scale ranging from “I strongly prefer 
Whites to Blacks” to “I strongly prefer Blacks to Whites”. 
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This item is treated as one single factor: 
● White Preference: This one-item measure describes the sympathy or liking of 
Whites and Blacks usually showing a White preference for White participants 
(Payne, Krosnick, Pasek, Lelkes, Akhtar, & Tompson, 2009). The higher the 
score, the higher one prefers Whites to Blacks. 
 
Attitudes towards Blacks Scale (Brigham, 1993, see 
Appendix I) 
 
Brigham (1993) agreed with the popular opinion that traditional prejudice measures 
are often rejected because they express discriminatory opinions too obviously, and 
went on to develop a questionnaire aimed at measuring discriminatory attitudes in 
more subtle ways. He did this by inventing items and gathering items from a number 
of newer questionnaires such as the Multifactor Racial Attitude Inventory (Brigham 
& Severy, 1976), the Symbolic Racism Scale (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & Kinder, 
1971), the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986; McConahay & Hough, 1976) as 
well as scale items by Muir (1989; Muir & Muir, 1988) and by Sidanius and Lau 
(1989). After several factor analyses he ended up with the “Attitudes towards Blacks 
Scale” (Brigham, 1993) comprising 20 items which participants rate on a scale 
ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). The completion of the 
scale takes approximately five minutes. 
 
Even though Brigham (1993) also developed an “Attitudes towards Whites Scale”, 
for this study only the following scale forming one single factor is of interest: 
● Attitudes towards Blacks (ATB): This factor describes racial attitudes towards 
Blacks when investigating various social issues such as urban crime, 
interracial marriage or racial integration in schools, businesses and residences. 
The factor includes items 1-20, of which the scores of the items 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 
10, 12, 15, 17 and 20 are reversed. High scores denote favorable and 
equalitarian views. 
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The Attitudes towards Blacks scale achieved a Cronbach-alpha reliability of .89 
(Brigham, 1993). 
 
Internal and External Motivation to Respond without 
Prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998, see Appendix J) 
 
Plant and Devine (1998) believed that it would be worthwhile to explore whether 
participants purposefully conceal their prejudice and stereotype in questionnaires 
because of social pressure, disapproval and possible sanctions. However, they argue 
that when assessing the motivation to respond without prejudice, one should not only 
focus on external motivation, but also has to consider internal motivation. Therefore, 
they developed the questionnaire “Internal and External Motivation to respond 
without Prejudice” (Plant & Devine, 1998). Participants rate 10 items on a scale 
ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 9 (“strongly agree”). The completion of the 
questionnaire takes approximately three minutes. 
 
The questionnaire has two scales each contributing to one factor: 
● Internal Motivation to Respond without Prejudice Scale (IMS): This Factor 
explains one’s internal motivation to respond without prejudice because of 
one’s personal attitudes, self-worth or beliefs. The factor includes items 6-10, 
of which the score of item 7 is reversed. 
● External Motivation to Respond without Prejudice Scale (EMS): This Factor 
describes one’s external motivation to respond without prejudice because of 
social pressure, today’s politically correct standards or disapproval and 
negative reactions from others. The factor includes items 1-5. 
 
Plant and Devine (1998) point out that they opted for a short version with only 10 
items because after testing three samples the Cronbach-alpha reliabilities remained 
between reasonable values ranging from .76 to .85. 
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3.5.5 Measurement of Familiarity 
 
Social Experiences Questionnaire (Brigham, 1993, see 
Appendix K) 
 
Brigham (1993) developed the “Social Experiences Questionnaire” (SEQ) in order to 
create a measurement that assesses the amount and quality of contact with Blacks. He 
developed several versions with a varying amount of items; correspondence with 
Brigham lead to the conclusion that the 27 version would be ideal for the purpose of 
this study. Participants rate the 27 items on a 9 point scale ranging from 1 
“friend/person” (or 0-9 % respectively) to 9 or more “friends/people” (or 90-100 %  
respectively) or on a 7 point scale ranging from 1 
(“none”/“unpleasant”/“unprofitable”) to 7  (“many”/“pleasant”/“profitable”). The 
completion of the questionnaire takes approximately 10 minutes. 
 
Several factor analyses lead to seven factors having been defined (Brigham, 1993; 
Slone, Brigham, & Meissner, 2000): 
● Current Contacts (CC): This factor is mostly based on items about the amount 
of people one talks to in an average week on campus, in recreational 
activities, in stores, in dorms and apartment complexes. The factor includes 
item 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13; all with a 9 point scale. 
● Past Contacts (PC): This factor mainly explains items asking about the 
percentage of Blacks in one’s elementary school, middle/junior school, high 
school and neighborhood. The factor includes item 1, 3, 5, 7, 16, 24; of which 
2 items were computed to fit a 9 point scale. 
● Past Friends (PF): This factor describes items asking how many friends one 
had in elementary school, middle/junior school, high school and 
neighborhood. The factor includes item 2, 4, 6; all with a 9 point scale. 
● Intimacy (I): The intimacy factor is based on intimate question like how many 
of one’s closet friends are Black or if one ever was on a date with a Black 
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person. The factor includes item  14, 15, 20; of which 1 item was computed to 
fit a 9 point scale. 
● Personal Outcomes (PO): This factor explains items that ask about the 
pleasantness and perceived benefit of past and future interactions with Blacks 
in personal settings. The factor includes item 21, 22, 23; all with a 7 point 
scale. 
● Social Outcomes (SO): This factor describes items that ask about the 
pleasantness and perceived benefit of past and future interactions with Blacks 
in social settings. The factor includes item 25, 26, 27; all with a 7 point scale. 
● Business Outcomes (BO): This factor is based on items that ask about the 
pleasantness and perceived benefit of past and future interactions with Blacks 
in business settings. The factor includes item 17, 18, 19; all with a 7 point 
scale. 
 
Indeed, the total SEQ score was correlated with the total ATB score with r (63) = .61, 
p < .01, suggesting a cumulative effect of contact with Blacks on attitudes towards 
Blacks (Slone & Brigham, 2000). Hence, people who have less prejudiced attitudes 
towards Blacks also report higher amount and quality of contact with Blacks.  
 
 
3.5.6 Measurement of Social Desirable Responding 
 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 
1994, German version by Musch, Brockhaus & Bröder, 2002, 
see Appendix L).  
 
Musch et al. (2002) translated the “Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding” 
(BIDR, Paulhus, 1994) from English to German and reduced the number of items 
from 40 to 20 based on the results of multiple factor analyses. The BIDR measures 
one’s tendency to lie and distort reality to create a more favorable image of oneself 
and others which is why the questionnaire can be used to assess participants’ general 
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tendency to answer truthfully. Since we employed various questionnaires assessing 
prejudice and stereotypes on which participants might have easily lied because of 
social pressure, it follows that including the BIDR would assist in reducing these 
confounding aspects. Participants rate the 20 items of the German BIDR on a scale 
ranging from 1 (“does not apply at all”) to 7 (“applies very much”).  The completion 
of the questionnaire takes approximately five minutes. 
 
The questionnaire has two scales each contributing to one factor: 
● Self-Deceptive Enhancement (SDE): This factor describes one’s subconscious 
tendency to answer in a manner to protect one’s self image and worth. A 
certain tendency to show self-deceptive enhancement is psychologically 
healthy and adaptive (Paulhus, 1994). The factor includes items 1-10, of 
which the scores of items 2, 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10 are reversed. 
● Impression Management (IM): This factor describes one’s conscious attempt 
to manipulate answers in order to present oneself in a positive way to others. 
The impression management scale correlates with many other questionnaires 
assessing lying such as personality questionnaires of Eysenck (Musch et al., 
2002). The factor includes item 11-20, of which the score of item 11, 12, 14, 
15, 17, 18 and 20 are reversed. 
 
As the name of the BIDR suggest, the items of both scales are balanced, meaning that 
they are poled positive as well as negative, which suppresses general positive or 
negative answer tendencies. 
 
Both scales have a satisfying reliability with an Alpha -cronbach  of .62 for the self-
deceptive enhancement scale and .65 for the impression management scale. 
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4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Behavioral Results 
  
Two mixed-design ANOVAs were performed with the between-subject factor 
familiarity (original colored, violet colored), the within-subject factor empathy for 
pain (pain, no pain), the within-subject factor race (White, Black) and either the 
dependent variable painfulness (how painful the situation was for the person whose 
hand was penetrated by a needle or touched by a Q-tip) or the dependent variable 
unpleasantness (how unpleasant it was for them to watch the situation). 
 
 
4.1.1 Results for Empathy for Pain of EEG Stimuli 
  
 
Figure 8. 
(A) Means of painfulness for pain (M = 5.14, SE = .15) and no pain (M = 1.10, SE = 
.03) 
(B) Means of unpleasantness for pain (M = 3.79, SE = .19) and no pain (M = 1.11, SE 
= .03). 
 
The first hypothesis (H1) is supported in that the ratings of painfulness were indeed 
higher for pain (M = 5.14, SE = .15) than for no pain (M = 1.10, SE = .03), F (1.00, 
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67.00) = 651.46, MSE = 1121.084, p < .001, as well as in that the ratings of 
unpleasantness were higher for pain (M = 3.79, SE = .19) than for no pain (M = 1.11, 
SE = .03), F (1.00, 67.00) = 214.47, MSE = 489.818, p < .001  (see Figure 8). 
 
 
4.1.2 Results for Race of EEG Stimuli 
  
In regard to the second hypothesis, that the ratings of painfulness and unpleasantness 
are higher for White than for Black, only a tendency was found that the ratings of 
painfulness were higher for White (M = 3.17, SE = .08) than for Black (M = 3.07, SE 
= .08), F (1.00, 67.00) = 3.55, MSE = 0.647, p = .064. 
  
  
4.1.2 Results for Empathy for Pain x Race Interaction 
of EEG Stimuli 
  
The third hypothesis (H3), that the ratings of painfulness and unpleasantness are 
higher for original colored White, violet colored White and violet colored Black than 
for original colored Black, was neither supported by a significant interaction of 
empathy for pain x race x familiarity for painfulness ratings, F (1.00, 67.00) = 0.79, 
MSE = 0.134, p = .377, nor by a significant interaction of empathy for pain x race x 
familiarity for unpleasantness ratings, F (1.00, 67.00) = 0.72, MSE = 0.008, p = .790, 
(see Figure 9). Nonetheless, a priori t-Tests were planned to investigate this 
interaction in greater detail. Since the paradigm empathy for pain is defined by a 
difference between pain and no pain, we calculated the difference pain minus no 
pain. 
 
Contrary to our prediction, neither for painfulness ratings was the difference of pain 
minus no pain higher for original colored White (M = 4.23, SE = .19) than for 
original colored Black (M = 4.17, SE = .22), t(36) = -0.40, p = .344 (one-tailed), r = 
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.06, nor for unpleasantness ratings was the difference of pain minus no pain higher 
for original colored White (M = 3.00, SE = .25) than for original colored Black (M = 
2.93, SE = .26), t(36) = -0.79, p = .215 (one-tailed), however, this did represent a 
small sized effect r = .13. 
  
Also, contrary to our prediction, for painfulness ratings the difference of pain minus 
no pain was not similar (meaning not significantly different) for violet colored White 
(M = 4.00, SE = .25) and violet colored Black (M = 3.76, SE = .26), t(31) = -2.11 p = 
.021 (one-tailed), r = .36. However, as predicted for unpleasantness ratings the 
difference of pain minus no pain was similar (meaning not significantly different) for 
violet colored White (M = 2.42, SE = .28) and violet colored Black (M = 2.31, SE = 
.25), t(31) = -0.84, p = .201 (one-tailed), r = .15. 
  
As predicted, for painfulness ratings the difference of pain minus no pain was similar 
(meaning not significantly different) for original colored White (M = 4.23, SE = .19) 
and violet colored White (M = 4.00, SE = .25), t(67) = .73, p = .233 (one-tailed), r = 
.08, and for unpleasantness ratings the difference of pain minus no pain was similar 
(meaning not significantly different) for original colored White (M = 3.00, SE = .25) 
and violet colored White (M = 2.42, SE = .28), t(67) = 1.52, p = .066 (one-tailed), r = 
.18. 
 
Contrary to our prediction, for painfulness ratings the difference of pain minus no 
pain was not higher for violet colored Black (M = 3.76, SE = .26) than for original 
colored Black (M = 4.17, SE = .22), t(67) = 1.19, p = .118 (one-tailed), however, this 
did represent a small sized effect r = .14. Also, contrary to our prediction, for 
unpleasantness ratings the difference of pain minus no pain was actually lower for 
violet colored Black (M = 2.31, SE = .14) than for original colored Black (M = 2.93, 
SE = .26), t(67) = 1.71, p = .046 (one-tailed), r = .20. 
  
Importantly, as predicted, regarding the effect sizes for painfulness ratings the 
difference of pain minus no pain comparing original colored White to violet colored 
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White did not represent a small effect, while the difference of pain minus no pain 
comparing original colored Black to violet colored Black did indeed represent a small 
effect. 
  
In conclusion, the third hypothesis that the ratings of painfulness and unpleasantness 
are higher for original colored White, violet colored White and violet colored Black 
than for original colored Black found only limited support. 
 
 
Figure 9. 
(A) Mean painfulness for empathy for pain x race x familiarity 
(B) Mean unpleasantness for empathy for pain x race x familiarity. 
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4.2 Results for Correlations between 
Painfulness and Unpleasantness of EEG 
Stimuli and Behavioral Measurements 
  
Results for Correlation between Painfulness and 
Unpleasantness of EEG Stimuli and Prosocial Behavior 
  
The 4th hypothesis (H4) is not supported meaning that neither the ratings of 
painfulness (calculated by subtracting the difference of original or violet colored 
Black pain minus original or violet colored Black no pain from the difference of 
original or violet colored White pain minus original or violet colored White no pain) 
correlated with prosocial behavior, rs = .02, p = .429 (one-tailed), nor were the ratings 
of unpleasantness (calculated by subtracting the difference of original or violet 
colored Black pain minus original or violet colored Black no pain from the 
difference of original or violet colored White pain minus original or violet colored 
White no pain) correlated with prosocial behavior, rs = .02, p = .420 (one-tailed). 
  
Results for Correlation between Painfulness and 
Unpleasantness of EEG Stimuli and Explicit Empathy 
  
Indeed, the 5th hypothesis (H5) was supported in that the higher one’s empathy for 
pain based on the ratings of painfulness (calculated by subtracting no pain from 
pain), the higher was one’s ability to identify with others, rs = .20, p = .046 (one-
tailed). Also, the higher one’s empathy for pain based on the ratings of 
unpleasantness (calculated by subtracting no pain from pain), the higher was one’s 
empathic concern, rs = .20, p = .046 (one-tailed), as well as the higher was one’s 
personal distress r = .23, p = .028 (one-tailed). 
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There was no significant relationship between one’s empathy for pain based on the 
ratings of painfulness (calculated by subtracting no pain from pain) and one’s 
perspective taking abilities, rs = -.00, p = .494 (one-tailed), one’s empathic concern rs 
= .08, p = .253 (one-tailed), or one’s personal distress, r = .01, p = .467 (one-tailed). 
Also, no significant relationship was found between the amount of one’s empathy for 
pain based on the ratings of unpleasantness (calculated by subtracting no pain from 
pain) and one’s perspective taking abilities rs = -.06, p = .286 (one-tailed), or one’s 
ability to identify with others, rs = .10, p = .192 (one-tailed). 
  
Results for Correlation between Painfulness and 
Unpleasantness of EEG Stimuli and Implicit and Explicit 
Racial Bias 
  
The 6th hypothesis (H6) was supported in that the higher the racial bias based on 
ratings of unpleasantness of the EEG stimuli (calculated by subtracting the difference 
of original colored Black pain minus original colored Black no pain from the 
difference of original colored White pain minus original colored White no pain), the 
less White preference, rs = -.32, p = .026 (one-tailed), and colder feelings for Blacks, 
rs = -.29, p = .040 (one-tailed). Also, there was a tendency for significance for higher 
racial bias based on ratings of painfulness of the EEG stimuli (calculated by 
subtracting the difference of original colored Black pain minus original colored 
Black no pain from the difference of original colored White pain minus original 
colored White no pain), colder feelings for Blacks, rs = -.24, p = .068 (one-tailed), 
more negative attitudes towards Blacks, rs = -.24, p = .072 (one-tailed), and less 
internal motivation to respond without prejudice, rs = -.23, p = .081 (one-tailed). 
  
No significant relationships were found between the racial bias based on ratings of 
painfulness of the EEG stimuli (calculated by subtracting the difference of original 
colored Black pain minus original colored Black no pain from the difference of 
original colored White pain minus original colored White no pain) and implicit racial 
bias measured with the IAT, rs = -.06, p = .359 (one-tailed), implicit racial bias 
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measured with the AMP, rs = -.03, p = .415 (one-tailed), White preference, rs = -.05, p 
= .366 (one-tailed), feelings for Whites, rs = -.16, p = .172 (one-tailed), feelings for 
White minus feelings for Blacks, rs = .05, p = .367 (one-tailed), or external 
motivation to respond without prejudice, rs = .07, p = .331 (one-tailed). Also, no 
significant relationships were found between the racial bias based on ratings of 
unpleasantness of the EEG stimuli (calculated by subtracting the difference of 
original colored Black pain minus original colored Black no pain from the difference 
of original colored White pain minus original colored White no pain) and implicit 
racial bias measured with the IAT, rs = .07, p = .355 (one-tailed), implicit racial bias 
measured with the AMP, rs = .14, p = .199 (one-tailed), feelings for Whites, rs = -20, 
p = .422 (one-tailed), feelings for White minus feelings for Blacks, rs = .03, p = .181 
(one-tailed), attitudes towards Blacks, rs = .13, p = .218 (one-tailed), internal 
motivation to respond without prejudice, rs = .20, p = .107 (one-tailed), or external 
motivation to respond without prejudice, rs = .08, p = .317 (one-tailed). 
  
Results for Correlation between Painfulness and 
Unpleasantness of EEG Stimuli and Familiarity 
  
The 7th hypothesis (H7) is supported in that there is a tendency for a significant 
relationship between current contacts with Blacks and painfulness of the EEG stimuli 
(calculated by subtracting the difference of original colored Black pain minus 
original colored Black no pain from the difference of original colored White pain 
minus original colored White no pain), rs = -.30, p = .064 (one-tailed), as well as 
unpleasantness of the EEG stimuli (calculated by subtracting the difference of 
original colored Black pain minus original colored Black no pain from the difference 
of original colored White pain minus original colored White no pain), rs = -.31, p = 
.055 (one-tailed). 
  
However, no significant relationship was found between painfulness of the EEG 
stimuli (calculated by subtracting the difference of original colored Black pain minus 
original colored Black no pain from the difference of original colored White pain 
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minus original colored White no pain) and past contacts, rs = .06, p = .690, past 
friends, rs = -.11, p = .511, intimacy, rs = -.03, p = .857, personal outcomes, rs = .04, p 
= .407, social outcomes, rs = -.11, p = .517 and business outcomes, rs = .03, p = .833. 
Also, no significant relationship was found between unpleasantness of the EEG 
stimuli (calculated by subtracting the difference of original colored Black pain minus 
original colored Black no pain from the difference of original colored White pain 
minus original colored White no pain) and past contacts, rs = .26, p = .108, past 
friends, rs = .08, p = .607, intimacy, rs = -.16, p = .327, personal outcomes, rs = -.05, p 
= .758, social outcomes, rs < -.00, p = .958 and business outcomes, rs = .02, p = .867. 
  
Results for Correlation between Painfulness and 
Unpleasantness of EEG Stimuli and Social Desirable 
Responding 
  
The 8th hypothesis (H8) was not supported meaning no significant relationship was 
found between the racial bias based on ratings of painfulness of the EEG stimuli 
(calculated by subtracting the difference of original colored Black pain minus 
original colored Black no pain from the difference of original colored White pain 
minus original colored White no pain) and self-deceptive enhancement, rs = .07, p = 
.334 (one-tailed) or impression management, rs = .03, p = .422 (one-tailed). Similarly, 
no significant relationship was found between the racial bias based on ratings of 
unpleasantness of the EEG stimuli (calculated by subtracting the difference of 
original colored Black pain minus original colored Black no pain from the difference 
of original colored White pain minus original colored White no pain) and self-
deceptive enhancement, rs = .04, p = .390 (one-tailed) or impression management, rs = 
-.04, p = .400 (one-tailed). 
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4.3 EEG Results  
 
A mixed-design ANOVA was performed with the between-subject factor familiarity 
(original colored, violet colored), the within-subject factor empathy for pain (pain, no 
pain), the within-subject factor race (White, Black), the within-subject factor area 
(frontal, central, parietal, occipital) and the within-subject factor side (left, middle, 
right). 
 
This five-factorial ANOVA was performed two times: 
 
1. First, using as dependent variable the alpha ERSP which was calculated by 
comparing the baseline of 500 ms pre-stimulus to the time window 1 (T1) of 
2000-3000 ms (showing a needle or Q-Tip moving towards a hand). 
2. Second, using as dependent variable the alpha ERSP which was calculated by 
comparing the baseline of 500 ms pre-stimulus to the time window 2 (T2) of 
3250-4250 ms (showing the hand being penetrated by a needle or touched by 
a Q-tip). 
 
Table 3 and 4 report the full results of these ANOVAs, followed by a selective 
discussion of the results that were most relevant for our hypotheses. All effects are 
reported as significant at p ≤ .05. 
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Table 3 
Analysis of Variance employing as Dependent Variable the ERSP for the Frequency 
Band Alpha (7 – 14 Hz) which was calculated by comparing the baseline of 500 ms 
pre-stimulus to the time window 1 (T1) of 2000-3000 ms post-stimulus 
Source df F η p 
 Between subjects 
Familiarity (F) 1 0.24 .00 .625 
F within-group error 67 (4.73)   
 Within subjects 
Pain (P) 1.00   0.71 .01 .402 
Race (R) 1.00   1.85 .02 .178 
Area (A) 2.23 51.39?? .43 .000 
Side (S) 1.86 20.17?? .23 .000 
P × F 1.00   6.95?? .09 .010 
P × A 1.62   1.3 .02 .260 
P × A × F 1.62   1.41 .02 .248 
P × S 1.59   5.74?? .07 .008 
P × S × F 1.59   0.90 .01 .387 
P × A × S 3.24   1.17 .01 .323 
P × A × S × F 3.24   0.99 .01 .400 
R × F 1.00   0.34 .00 .561 
R × A 2.03   2.26 .03 .107 
R × A × F 2.03   5.27?? .07 .006 
R × S 1.43   1.14 .01 .307 
R × S × F 1.43   0.74 .01 .435 
R × A × S 3.81   1.04 .01 .382 
R × A × S × F 3.81   1.09 .01 .358 
P × R 1.00   3.06 .04 .085 
P × R × F 1.00   0.77 .01 .381 
P × R × A 1.98   1.09 .01 .336 
P × R × A × F 1.98   0.40 .00 .668 
P × R × S 1.63   0.55 .00 .542 
P × R × S × F 1.63   1.05 .01 .339 
P × R × A × S 3.20   0.61 .09 .615 
P × R × A × S × F 3.20   0.26 .00 .861 
A × F 2.23   0.12 .00 .905 
S × F 1.86   1.52 .02 .221 
A × S 4.65 11.22?? .14 .000 
A × S × F 4.65   1.10 .01 .356 
P × R within group error 67  (5.96)   
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. F = Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected F values; df = Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Table 4 
Analysis of Variance employing as Dependent Variable the ERSP for the Frequency 
Band Alpha (7 – 14 Hz) which was calculated by comparing the baseline of 500 ms 
pre-stimulus to the time window 2 (T2) of 3250-4250 ms post-stimulus 
Source df F η p 
 Between subjects 
Familiarity (F) 1 0.06 .00 .808 
F within-group error 67 (2.84)   
 Within subjects 
Pain (P) 1.00 13.89?? .01 .000 
Race (R) 1.00   0.84 .01 .360 
Area (A) 2.18 44.14?? .39 .000 
Side (S) 1.93 20.14?? .23 .000 
P × F 1.00   1.73 .02 .193 
P × A 2.03   2.91? .04 .057 
P × A × F 2.03   1.31 .01 .272 
P × S 1.85   1.31 .01 .271 
P × S × F 1.85   1.43 .02 .243 
P × A × S 3.25   0.97 .01 .442 
P × A × S × F 3.25   0.92 .01 .434 
R × F 1.00   2.55 .03 .115 
R × A 1.97   2.65 .03 .075 
R × A × F 1.97   4.89?? .06 .009 
R × S 1.61   0.05 .00 .921 
R × S × F 1.61   0.31 .00 .681 
R × A × S 4.24   1.35 .02 .246 
R × A × S × F 4.24   1.08 .01 .370 
P × R 1.00   2.92 .04 .092 
P × R × F 1.00   0.01 .00 .907 
P × R × A 2.04   3.92? .05 .021 
P × R × A × F 2.04   0.98 .01 .383 
P × R × S 1.50   1.19 .01 .297 
P × R × S × F 1.50   0.21 .00 .804 
P × R × A × S 3.23   0.21 .00 .901 
P × R × A × S × F 3.23   1.85 .02 .134 
A × F 2.18   1.09 .01 .352 
S × F 1.93   0.76 .01 .468 
A × S 4.57 11.52?? .14 .000 
A × S × F 4.57   0.96 .01 .435 
P × R within group error 67  (5.77)   
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. F = Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected F ratios; df = Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom. 
* p ≤ .05. ** p ≤ .01. 
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4.3.1 Results for Empathy for Pain - Hypothesis  
 
The 9th hypothesis (H9), the “Empathy for Pain - Hypothesis”, is supported for time 
2, meaning that indeed participants showed more alpha desynchronization for pain 
(M = -2.37, SE = .21) than for no pain (M = -2.02, SE = .20), F (1.00, 67.00) = 13.89, 
MSE = 97.291, p < .001 (see Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10.  
(A) Mean ERSP for pain (M = -2.37, SE = .21) and for no pain (M = -2.02, SE = .20) 
(B) Topografic plots for alpha (7-14 Hz) for time 2 (3250ms - 4250 ms) 
(C) Time-frequency plot for electrode 45 in the central area on the left side. 
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Also, for time 2 a trend towards for a significant interaction was found for empathy 
for pain and area, F (2.03, 136.01) = 2.91, MSE = 1.692, p = .057 (see Figure 11). As 
one can see, when looking at absolute values of alpha suppression, the most 
suppression seems to appear in the occipital area for pain (M = 3.18, SE = .27) and no 
pain (M = -2.93, SE = .26), medium suppression in the parietal area for pain (M = -
2.56, SE = .24) and no pain (M = -2.17, SE = .22), and the lowest in the central for 
pain (M = -1.90, SE = .20) and no pain (M = -1.49, SE = .18) as well as the frontal for 
pain (M = -1.83, SE = .21) and no pain (M = -1.50, SE = .20). Since the very strong 
alpha suppression for the occipital area was most likely related to visual stimulation, 
we conducted another ANOVA (for complete ANOVA Table see Appendix N) in 
which we used as a dependent variable the alpha ERSP which was calculated by 
comparing the time window 2 (T2) of 3250-4250 ms to the baseline of 1000-1500 ms 
post-stimulus (showing a hand without needle or Q-tip) instead of comparing the time 
window 2 to the baseline of 500 ms pre-stimulus (showing a fixation cross). The 
logic behind this is that the very high alpha suppression for the occipital area may is 
the consequence of visual processing which is very pronounced when comparing a 
visually simplistic fixation cross to a visually complex video in which a needle is 
penetrating a hand or a Q-tip is touching the hand. Comparatively, this should be less 
pronounced when comparing a visually complex video of a hand without needle or 
Q-tip to a similarly visually complex video in which a needle is penetrating a hand or 
a Q-tip is touching the hand. In the ANOVA with the hand as baseline, a significant 
interaction was found for empathy for pain and area, F (2.29, 153.80) = 5.11, MSE = 
1.377, p = .005. Now, different from when we conducted the ANOVA with the 
fixation cross as baseline, when looking at the absolute values of alpha suppression 
for the ANOVA with the hand as baseline, less absolute difference was found 
between the occipital area for pain (M = -0.24, SE = .08) and no pain (M = -0.36, SE 
= .08), the parietal area for pain (M = -0.21, SE = .10) and no pain (M = -0.46, SE = 
.10), the central area for pain (M = -0.05, SE = .08) and no pain (M = -0.23, SE = .08) 
and the frontal area for pain (M = -0.18, SE = .07) and no pain (M = -0.06, SE = .07). 
Hence, the very alpha desynchronization in occipital areas does indeed arise from 
visual processing. Nonetheless, we opted to continue to test our hypotheses with 
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ANOVAs using the fixation cross as baseline, as all other similar studies have used a 
fixation cross as baseline, and we wanted our results to be comparable to them. 
Finally, since the paradigm empathy for pain is defined by a difference between pain 
and no pain, planned t-Tests were conducted to assess whether this difference was 
significant at all areas, which was the case: In the frontal area, pain (M = -1.82, SE = 
1.73) was more suppressed than no pain (M = -1.50, SE = 1.68), t(68) = -4.22, p < 
.001, r = .45. In the central area, pain (M = -1.89, SE = .20) was more suppressed 
than no pain (M = -1.49, SE = .17), t(68) = 4.00, p < .001, r =.45. In the parietal area, 
pain (M =  -2.55, SE = .23) was more suppressed than no pain (M = -1.82, SE = .19), 
t(68) = -6.23, p < .001, r =  .63. In the occipital area, pain (M = -3.17, SE = 0.26) was 
more suppressed than no pain (M = -2.93, SE = 0.25), t(68) = 2.11, p = .019 (one-
tailed), r =  .25. Hence, even though this difference in total was very suppressed in 
the occipital area, what is important is that we still found that pain is more suppressed 
than no pain (and not no pain more than pain) for all areas. Interestingly, regarding 
the effect sizes, the difference of pain minus no pain represented a medium-sized 
effect in the frontal and central area, a large-sized effect in the parietal area, but only 
a small-sized effect in the occipital area. 
 
Furthermore, for time 1 a significant interaction was revealed for empathy for pain 
and side, F (1.59, 106.66) =  5.74, MSE = 0.982, p = .008. However, our hypothesis 
that more alpha suppression is found on the left side than the right side was not 
supported, in fact the opposite seemed to be case, meaning that for pain more alpha 
desynchronization was found than on the right side (M = -2.90, SE = .29) than on the 
left side (M = -2.65, SE = .28) as well as no pain was more suppressed on the right 
side (M = -2.78, SE = .26) than on the left side (M = -2.60, SE = .26). However, this 
does not reveal much, because the paradigm empathy for pain is defined by a 
difference between pain and no pain. We therefore conducted planned t-Tests in 
order to assess whether the difference of pain minus no pain was significant at both 
sides, which was the case: On the left side, more alpha desynchronization was found 
for pain (M = -2.62, SE = .28) than for no pain  (M = -2.60, SE = .26), t(68) = -3.86, p 
< .001, r =  .45. Also, on the right side, more alpha desynchronization was found for 
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pain (M = -2.90, SE = .29) than for no pain (M = -2.78, SE = .26), t(68) = -3.45, p = 
.001 r = .38. Hence, even though this difference in total was more suppressed on the 
right than the left side, what is important is that we still found that pain is more 
suppressed than no pain (and not no pain more than pain) on both sides. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Mean ERSP for empathy for pain for time 2. 
(A) Mean ERSP for pain and no pain in the frontal area on the left and right side 
(B) Mean ERSP for pain and no pain in the central area on the left and right side 
(C) Mean ERSP for pain and no pain in the parietal area on the left and right side 
(D) Mean ERSP for pain and no pain in the occipital area on the left and right side. 
96 
4.3.2 Results for Race - Hypothesis 
 
In regards to the 10th hypothesis (H10), the “Race - Hypothesis”, which states that 
more alpha desynchronization is found for White than for Black, a significant race x 
area x familiarity interaction was found for time 1, F (2.03, 136.23) =  5.27, MSE = 
5.852, p = .006, as well as for time 2, F (1.97, 132.38) =  4.89, MSE = 5.432, p = 
.009, (see Figure 12). However, this does not support our “Race - Hypothesis”, 
because neither for time 1 more alpha desynchronization was found for original 
colored White in the frontal (M = -1.66, SE = .333), central (M = -2.04, SE = .344), 
parietal (M = -2.89, SE = .422) and occipital area (M = -3.45, SE = .432) than for 
original colored Black in the frontal (M = -1.58, SE = .347), central (M = -1.87, SE = 
.359), parietal (M = -2.79, SE = .422) and occipital area (M = -3.56, SE = .443) nor 
for time 2 more alpha desynchronization was found for original colored White in the 
frontal (M = -1.60, SE = .286), central (M = -1.68, SE = .261), parietal (M = -2.31, 
SE = .326) and occipital area (M = -2.89, SE = .373) than for original colored Black 
in the frontal (M = -1.62, SE = 2.82), central (M = -1.60, SE = .260), parietal (M = -
2.33, SE = .303) and occipital area (M = -3.15, SE = .352), (see Figure 10).  
 
 
Figure 12. Race x familiarity x area interaction for time 2. 
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4.3.3 Results for Empathy for Pain x Race Interaction - 
Hypothesis 
 
The main hypothesis that this thesis strives to address is the 11th hypothesis, the 
“Empathy for Pain x Race - Hypothesis”, which says that the difference in alpha 
suppression of pain minus no pain is more suppressed for original colored White, 
violet colored White and violet colored Black than for original colored Black. 
Further, we hypothesize that this interaction reveals itself in somatosensory 
desynchronization, and therefore should be significant in central areas and perhaps 
also in parietal, but not in frontal and occipital areas. Also, since participants watched 
stimuli showing right hands, this interaction should be even stronger over the left 
hemisphere than over the right hemisphere due to lateralized resonance. 
 
The most specific assessment of our hypothesis is achieved, when one looks at 
whether the empathy for pain, race and familiarity interaction is displayed in each 
individual area and for each individual side. Hence, one needs to look at the five-way 
interaction of empathy for pain, race, familiarity, area and side. 
 
For time 2 no significant interaction of empathy for pain, race, familiarity, area and 
side can be reported, F (3.23, 216.57) =  1.85, MSE = 0.180, p = .134. Also ANOVAs 
which were conducted separately for all four areas did not reveal a significant pain x 
race x familiarity interaction in the frontal area, F (1.00, 67.00) =  0.05, MSE = 0.018, 
p = .824,  in the central area, F (1.00, 67.00) =  0.06, MSE = 0.034, p = .803, in the 
parietal area, F (1.00, 67.00) =  0.20, MSE = 0.158, p = .655 or in the occipital area, 
F (1.00, 67.00) =  0.49, MSE = 0.342, p = .483. Nonetheless, a priori it was planned 
to investigate the pain x race x familiarity interaction in the greatest detail with a 
number of dependent and independent t-Tests, (see Figure 13 A - B which show the 
empathy for pain, race and familiarity interaction for the central area on the left side). 
Since the paradigm empathy for pain is defined by a difference between pain and no 
pain, we calculated the difference of pain minus no pain. 
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Figure 13. 
(A) Empathy for pain x race x familiarity for the central area and left side for time 2 
(B) Topografic plots for alpha (7-14 Hz) for time 2 (3250ms - 4250 ms). 
 
First, the assumption of the “Empathy for Pain x Race - Hypothesis” was assessed 
stating that the difference in alpha suppression of pain minus no pain is more 
suppressed for original colored White, violet colored White and violet colored Black 
than for original colored Black, and that this interaction reveals itself in 
somatosensory desynchronization and therefore should be significant in the central 
area and possibly in the parietal area, but not in frontal and occipital areas. 
 
As predicted, in the central area the difference in alpha suppression of pain minus no 
pain was significantly more suppressed for original colored White (M =  -0.41, SE = 
.15) than for original colored Black (M = -0.12, SE = .63), t(36) = 1.70, p = .048 
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(one-tailed), which almost represents a medium-sized effect r =  .27. Also, in the 
parietal area the difference in alpha suppression of pain minus no pain was 
significantly more suppressed for original colored White (M = -0.42, SE = .16) than 
for original colored Black (M = -0.03, SE = .12), t(36) = 1.92, p = .031 (one-tailed), 
which also almost represents a medium-sized effect r = .27. As hypothesized, in the 
frontal area the difference of pain minus no pain was not significantly more 
suppressed for original colored White (M =  -0.32, SE = .13) than for original colored 
Black (M = -0.22, SE = .09), t(36) = 0.61, p = .270 (one-tailed), r =  .10. However, in 
the occipital area the difference of pain minus no pain was more suppressed for 
original colored White (M = -0.26, SE = .74) than for original colored Black (M = -
0.03, SE = .69), t(36) = 2.15, p = .019 (one-tailed), but this result may have only 
become significant due to visual processing and only represents a small-sized effect r 
= .10 
 
Also, as predicted, in the central area the difference in alpha suppression of pain 
minus no pain was similarly (meaning not significantly different) suppressed for 
violet colored White (M = -0.64, SE = .32) and for violet colored Black (M = -0.45, 
SE = .10), t(31) = 0.595, p = .278 (one-tailed), r = .10, in the parietal area the 
difference in alpha suppression of pain minus no pain was similarly suppressed for 
violet colored White (M = -0.76, SE = .35) and for violet colored Black (M = -0.96, 
SE = .15), t(31) = -0.53, p = .299 (one-tailed), r = .09, in the frontal area the 
difference in alpha suppression of pain minus no pain was similarly suppressed for 
violet colored White (M = -0.39, SE = .23) and for violet colored Black (M = -0.35, 
SE = .10), t(31) = 0.14, p = .443 (one-tailed), r = .02, as well as in the occipital area 
the difference in alpha suppression of pain minus no pain was similarly suppressed 
for violet colored White (M = -0.66, SE = 2.20) and for violet colored Black (M = -
0.08, SE = .76), t(31) = 1.45, p = .077 (one-tailed), r =.03. 
 
Further, as predicted, in the central area the difference in alpha suppression of pain 
minus no pain was similarly (meaning not significantly different) suppressed for 
original colored White (M = -0.41, SE = .15) and for violet colored White (M = -0.64, 
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SE = .32), t(67) = 0.68, p = .249 (one-tailed), r = .08, in the parietal area the 
difference in alpha suppression of pain minus no pain was similarly suppressed for 
original colored White (M = -0.42, SE = .16) and for violet colored White (M = -0.76, 
SE = .35), t(67) = 0.92, p = .180 (one-tailed), r = .11, in the frontal area the difference 
in alpha suppression of pain minus no pain was similarly suppressed for original 
colored White (M = -0.32, SE = .13) and for violet colored White (M = -0.39, SE = 
.23), t(67) = 0.25, p = .400 (one-tailed), r = .03, as well as in the occipital area the 
difference of pain minus no pain was similarly suppressed for violet colored White 
(M = -0.26, SE = .12) and for original colored White (M = -0.66, SE = .38), t(67) = 
0.99, p = .163 (one-tailed), r = .03. 
 
Importantly, as predicted, only in the central area was the difference in alpha 
suppression of pain minus no pain significantly more suppressed for violet colored 
Black (M =  -0.45, SE = .10) than for original colored Black (M = -0.12, SE = .10), 
t(67) = 2.13, p = .018 (one-tailed), which almost represented a medium-sized effect r 
= .25. This however, is not found for any other of the areas: In the parietal area the 
difference in alpha suppression of pain minus no pain was not significantly more 
suppressed for violet colored Black (M =  -0.35, SE = .14) than for original colored 
Black (M = -0.03, SE = .12), t(67) = 1.61, p = .056 (one-tailed), r = .07, in the frontal 
area the difference in alpha suppression of pain minus no pain was not significantly 
more suppressed for violet colored Black (M =  -0.35, SE = .10) than for original 
colored Black (M = -0.22, SE = .09), t(67) = 0.92, p = .180 (one-tailed), r = .11, as 
well as in the occipital area the difference in alpha suppression of pain minus no pain 
was not significantly more suppressed for violet colored Black (M = -0.08, SE = .13) 
than for original colored Black (M = -0.03, SE = .11), t(67) = 0.69, p = .244 (one-
tailed), r =.11. 
 
Very importantly, regarding the effect sizes, the difference of pain minus no pain 
comparing original colored White to violet colored White did not represent a small 
sized effect in the central, parietal, frontal or occipital area. In comparison though, 
the difference of pain minus no pain comparing original colored Black to violet 
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colored Black did almost represent a medium-sized effect in central areas, but only 
not a small-sized effect in parietal areas and only a small-sized effect in frontal and 
occipital areas. 
 
In conclusion, the first assumption of the “Empathy for Pain x Race - Hypothesis” 
was supported by the results. The difference in alpha suppression of pain minus no 
pain was more suppressed for original colored White, violet colored White and violet 
colored Black than for original colored Black and that this interaction revealed itself 
in the central area. In the parietal area, we only found support for this hypothesis in 
that original colored White was more suppressed than original colored Black. In the 
frontal area, we did not find any significant results. In the occipital area, surprisingly, 
original colored White was more suppressed than original colored Black, but this 
result may have only become significant due to visual processing. 
 
Second, we tested the assumption of the “Empathy for Pain x Race - Hypothesis”, 
that since participants watched stimuli showing right hands, this interaction should be 
even stronger over the left hemisphere than over the right hemisphere due to 
lateralized resonance. In fact, when not assessing the central area averaged across all 
sides, but only assessing the central area on the left side, results were even more 
pronounced (see Figure 14): In the central area on the left side, the difference in alpha 
suppression of pain minus no pain was significantly more suppressed for original 
colored White (M =  -0.49, SE = .99) than for original colored Black (M = -0.08, SE = 
.11), t(36) = 2.13, p = .019, which represented a medium-sized effect r = .33. Also, 
the difference in alpha suppression of pain minus no pain was significantly more 
suppressed for violet colored Black (M =  -0.45, SE = .10) than for original colored 
Black (M = -0.82, SE = .11), t(68) = 2.30, p = .012, which represented almost a 
medium-sized effect r = .27. In conclusion, the second assumption of the “Empathy 
for Pain x Race - Hypothesis” was only somewhat supported by the results. More 
suppression was found when only assessing the central area on the left side than 
when assessing the central area averaged across all sides, but only a tendency was 
found for more suppression in the left central side than the right central side. 
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Figure 14. 
(A) Empathy for pain x race x familiarity for the central area and left side 
(B) Empathy for pain x race x familiarity for the central area and middle side 
(C) Empathy for pain x race x familiarity for the central area and right side. 
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4.4 Results for Correlations between EEG and 
Behavioral Measurements 
 
Results for Correlation between EEG Measurements 
Evaluations assessing EEG Stimuli 
 
Indeed, the 12th hypothesis (H12) was supported in regard to the ratings of 
painfulness and unpleasantness of the EEG stimuli: There was a significant 
relationship between alpha suppression measured with EEG (calculated by 
subtracting the difference of original or violet colored Black pain minus original or 
violet colored Black no pain from the difference of original or violet colored White 
pain minus original or violet colored White no pain) and the rating of how painful the 
situation was for the person whose hand was penetrated by a needle or touched by a 
Q-tip, (calculated by subtracting the difference of original or violet colored Black 
pain minus original or violet colored Black no pain from the difference of original or 
violet colored White pain minus original or violet colored White no pain), rs = .20, p 
= .043 (one-tailed). Also, there was a significant relationship between alpha 
suppression measured with EEG and the rating of how unpleasant it was for the 
participants to watch the situation (calculated by subtracting the difference of original 
or violet colored Black pain minus original or violet colored Black no pain from the 
difference of original or violet colored White pain minus original or violet colored 
White no pain), rs = .22, p = .033 (one-tailed). 
 
However, alpha suppression measured with EEG was not correlated with 
believability of the EEG stimuli, rs = .10, p = .205 (one-tailed), and prosocial 
behavior in response to the EEG stimuli (H13), rs = .04, p = .373 (one-tailed). 
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Results for Correlation between EEG Measurements 
Explicit Empathy 
 
The 14th hypothesis (H14) was supported in that there was a significant relationship 
between neurological empathy for pain (calculated by subtracting no pain from pain) 
and one’s own personal distress when observing others in need, rs = .22, p = .031 
(one-tailed). 
 
Also, there was a tendency for a significant relationship to be found between 
neurological empathy for pain (calculated by subtracting no pain from pain) and 
one’s empathic concern when observing others in need, rs = .17, p = .079 (one-tailed). 
As well as, a tendency for a significant relationship between neurological empathy 
for pain (calculated by subtracting no pain from pain) and one’s ability to identify 
with others, rs = .16, p = .094 (one-tailed). 
 
There was no significant relationship between neurological empathy for pain 
(calculated by subtracting no pain from pain) and one’s perspective taking abilities, rs 
= -.07, p = .271 (one-tailed). 
 
We also found a significant correlation between EEG data and the amount of 
empathic concern, which describes other-oriented feelings of concern that one has 
when observing others in need. There was a significant relationship between alpha 
suppression measured with EEG (calculated by subtracting the difference of original 
or violet colored Black pain minus original or violet colored Black no pain from the 
difference of original or violet colored White pain minus original or violet colored 
White no pain) and ratings of empathic concern, rs = .26, p = .014 (one-tailed). 
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Results for Correlation between EEG Measurements 
Implicit Racial Bias and Explicit Racial Bias 
 
In regard to the 15th hypothesis (H15) no significant relationships were found 
between the neurological racial bias (calculated by subtracting the difference of 
original colored Black pain minus original colored Black no pain from the difference 
of original colored White pain minus original colored White no pain) and implicit 
racial bias measured with the IAT, rs = .17, p = .158 (one-tailed), implicit racial bias 
measured with the AMP, rs = -.02, p = .449 (one-tailed), White preference, rs = .02, p 
= .448 (one-tailed), feelings for Whites, rs = .01, p = .472 (one-tailed), feelings for 
Blacks, rs = -.15, p = .179 (one-tailed), feelings for White minus feelings for Blacks, 
rs = .15, p = .181 (one-tailed), attitudes towards Blacks, rs = .14, p = .197 (one-tailed), 
internal motivation to respond without prejudice, rs = .02, p = .443 (one-tailed), or 
external motivation to respond without prejudice, rs = -.13, p = .211 (one-tailed). 
 
Results for Correlation between EEG Measurements 
Explicit Familiarity 
 
The 16th hypothesis (H16) was supported in that there was a relationship between 
neurological racial bias (calculated by subtracting the difference of original colored 
Black pain minus original colored Black no pain from the difference of original 
colored White pain minus original colored White no pain) and the pleasantness and 
perceived benefit of past and future interactions with Blacks in business settings, rs = 
-.48, p = .002. 
 
The relationships between neurological racial bias (calculated by subtracting the 
difference of original colored Black pain minus original colored Black no pain from 
the difference of original colored White pain minus original colored White no pain) 
and current contacts, rs = -.13, p = .421, past contacts, rs = -.05, p = .734, past friends, 
rs = .21, p = .205, intimacy, rs = -.00, p = .990, personal outcomes, rs = .01, p = .936, 
and social outcomes, rs = .08, p = .635, were not significant. 
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Results for Correlation between EEG Measurements Social 
Desirable Responding 
 
The 17th hypothesis (H17) that there is a relationship between neurological racial bias 
(calculated by subtracting the difference of original colored Black pain minus 
original colored Black no pain from the difference of original colored White pain 
minus original colored White no pain) and social desirable responding was neither 
supported for self-deceptive enhancement, rs = -.15, p = .186 (one-tailed), nor 
impression management, rs = .12, p = .233 (one-tailed). 
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Interpretation of Main Results 
 
The research question this study aimed to address is whether alpha desynchronization 
during empathy for pain is modulated by racial group membership. Previous studies 
exploring similar questions were helpful in shaping our research question. For 
example, Yang et al. (2008), Perry et al. (2010) and Whitmarsh et al. (2011) found 
more alpha desynchronization during empathy for pain. Second, using fMRI Xu et al. 
(2009) found that racial group membership modulated affective components during 
empathy for pain. Lastly, using TMS Avenanti et al. (2010) found that racial group 
membership modulated motor components during empathy for pain. However, to our 
knowledge no one has yet studied whether racial group membership modulates 
somatosensory components during empathy for pain. We argue that the alpha 
desynchronization we assess can be interpreted as somatosensory alpha 
desynchronization, because our pain stimuli are somatosensory in their nature, 
because we mainly find somatosensory desynchronization in the time window 2 in 
which no motion is present in our stimuli and because other research from our field 
also defend interpretations of suppressed somatosensory oscillations and 
somatosensory desynchronization (Stancák, 2006; Cheng et al., 2008; Whitmarsh, et 
al., 2011). 
 
In our study White participants watched video clips of a hand being penetrated by a 
needle (pain) or being touched by a Q-tip (no pain). These hands either belonged to a 
White (White) or a Black (Black) person. Since Avenanti et al. (2010) argued that the 
lesser empathy for pain response for out-groups compared to in-groups might not be 
caused by racial bias but could also simply stem from less familiarity with out-
groups, we replicated Avenanti et al. (2010) including control groups with unfamiliar 
digitally violet colored White and Black stimuli. In a first EEG session, participants 
watched pain and no pain stimuli from original colored White and original colored 
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Black hands. In a second EEG session, a new group of participants watched pain and 
no pain stimuli with violet colored White and violet colored Black hands. Our main 
hypothesis was that the difference in alpha suppression of pain minus no pain is more 
suppressed for original colored White, violet colored White and violet colored Black 
than for original colored Black. Further, we hypothesize that this interaction reveals 
itself in somatosensory desynchronization, and therefore should be significant in 
central areas, with some potential parietal involvement, but should not be significant 
in frontal and occipital areas. Also, since participants watched stimuli showing right 
hands, this interaction should be even stronger over the left hemisphere than over the 
right hemisphere due to lateralized resonance. 
 
After comparing the baseline of 500 ms pre-stimulus (showing a fixation cross) to the 
time of 3250 - 4250 ms post-stimulus (showing a hand being penetrated by a needle 
or touched by a Q-tip) we found no tendency for a significant interaction of empathy 
for pain x race x familiarity x area x side. Nevertheless, à-priori planned t-Tests  
revealed the predicted assumptions. 
 
In the central area, more alpha desynchronization for the difference of pain minus no 
pain was found for original colored White than for original colored Black. 
Interpreting this, one could conclude that racial group membership modulates 
empathy for pain. In accordance with our result, when assessing the difference of 
pain minus no pain in the first dorsal interosseous muscle with TMS Avenanti et al. 
(2010) reported finding a more inhibited MEP amplitude for stimuli depicting in-
group members than for stimuli depicting out-group members. However, since this 
result does not control for the factor of familiarity, more tests were conducted 
introducing the unfamiliar violet colored White and violet colored Black groups. 
 
In line with this topic, in the central area alpha desynchronization for the difference 
of pain minus no pain was not significantly different for violet colored White and 
violet colored Black. Hence, since participants from the second EEG session did not 
significantly differentiate between violet colored White and violet colored Black 
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stimuli it implies that the original stimuli colors did not show through the violet color 
enough for the White participants to have more empathy for pain for violet colored 
White than for violet colored Black. Avenanti et al. (2010) did not differentiate 
between violet colored in-group stimuli and violet colored out-group stimuli and we 
found it important to make that distinction. 
 
Moreover, in the central area alpha desynchronization for the difference of pain 
minus no pain was not significantly different for original colored White and for violet 
colored White. Differently, Avenanti et al. (2010) report a finding of a more inhibited 
AMP amplitude for stimuli depicting in-group members than for stimuli depicting 
violet colored in- and out-group members. This might be explained by considering 
that in Avenanti et al.´s (2010) study, participants watched the originally colored 
White and Black stimuli in a first EEG session, and then the same participants 
watched the violet colored White and Black stimuli in a second session. Hence, 
participants might have been able to guess that the violent hands from the second 
session were simply colored versions of the same hands from the first session, and 
therefore showed more inhibition for violet colored White than violet colored Black 
stimuli. If this is the case, then it explains why when violet colored White and violet 
colored Black stimuli were analyzed as one violet group, they found more inhibition 
for the in-group than the violet group. 
 
More pertinent to our central question, in the central area more alpha 
desynchronization for the difference of pain minus no pain was found for violet 
colored Black than for original colored Black stimuli. This result supports the 
conclusion that the lesser empathy for pain response for racial out-groups is caused 
by racial bias and does not simply stem from less familiarity with out-groups in 
general. In accordance with this result, Avenanti et al. (2010) also found a more 
inhibited MEP amplitude for stimuli depicting violet colored in- and out-group 
members than for racial out-group members. 
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These results for the central area lead us to conclude that our main hypothesis was 
supported, and that alpha desynchronization during empathy for pain is modulated 
substantially by racial group membership. In order to validate that the 
desynchronization we measured actually can be interpreted as somatosensory 
desynchronization we repeated the above mentioned four planned t-Tests for the 
other areas. If our conclusion about somatosensory desynchronization is correct then 
we should only find the predicted empathy for pain x race x familiarity interaction in 
central or parietal areas, but not in frontal or occipital areas. Indeed, for the frontal 
area none of the planned t-Tests were significant. The only significant result found 
for the parietal and occipital area was that more alpha desynchronization for the 
difference of pain minus no pain was found for original colored White than for 
original colored Black. Other studies (for example Perry et al., 2011) have also found 
increased alpha suppression during empathy for pain in occipital areas and have 
concluded that it may only represent visual processing. Therefore, we do not believe 
that this alpha suppression in the occipital area disproves our hypothesis. In general 
though, given the low spatial resolution of EEG, we cannot unequivocally interpret 
the alpha desynchronization as somatosensory alpha desynchronization. 
 
In our final result we found only a tendency for the empathy for pain x race x 
familiarity interaction to be more pronounced on the left side than on the right side. 
We had assumed a greater affect due to lateralized resonance, as participants would 
be seeing a right hand in stimuli videos. 
 
Besides the empathy for pain x race x familiarity interaction when comparing the 
baseline of 500 ms pre-stimulus (showing a fixation cross) to the time of 3250 - 4250 
ms (showing a hand being penetrated by a needle or touched by a Q-tip), we also 
found a significant main effect of empathy for pain, and an interaction between 
empathy for pain and area. Planned t-Tests revealed that more alpha 
desynchronization was found for pain than for no pain in frontal, central, parietal 
and occipital areas. These results are contradictory to the results of Yang et al. 
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(2008), Perry et al. (2010) and Whitmarsh et al. (2011) who found more alpha 
suppression for pain than for no pain only in central and frontal areas. 
 
Turning to the discussion of behavioral results, we found that compared to no pain 
stimuli, pain stimuli were indeed judged as more painful for the subjects in the videos 
and as more unpleasant for the participants to watch. Even though the behavioral 
results only showed very limited support that the ratings of painfulness and 
unpleasantness are higher for original colored White, violet colored White and violet 
colored Black than for original colored Black, we did find a significant correlation 
between the EEG data and ratings of painfulness and unpleasantness. Participants 
who for the difference of pain minus no pain showed more alpha suppression for 
original or violet colored White stimuli than for original or violet colored Black 
stimuli, also demonstrated for the difference of pain minus no pain higher ratings of 
painfulness or unpleasantness for original or violet colored White stimuli than for 
original or violet colored Black stimuli. This can be considered a manipulation check. 
Even if participant’s reactions resulted from predominately pre-conscious conditions, 
they still employed cognitive and executive functions. This suggests a strong link 
between our neurological findings and behavioral findings in regard to how 
participant’s empathy for pain response is modulated by racial group membership. 
 
Furthermore, a significant correlation was found between EEG data and personal 
distress, which describes self-oriented feelings of distress one has when observing 
others in need. Moreover, a tendency for a significant correlation was found between 
EEG data and one’s amount of empathic concern as well as one’s perspective taking 
abilities. Summarizing all these results, participants who demonstrated more alpha 
desynchronization for pain than for no pain also represented themselves as having 
more feelings of personal distress when observing others in need and showed a 
tendency to also have greater empathic concern and perspective taking abilities. This 
was also supported by behavioral results which demonstrated that the higher ratings 
of painfulness for the difference of pain minus no pain, the higher one’s ability to 
identify with others; and the higher ratings of unpleasantness for the difference of 
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pain minus no pain, the higher ratings of empathic concern and personal distress. 
These findings relate to Batson et al.´s (1987) model which explains that seeing 
someone else in distress can either cause one to feel the emotions of personal distress 
and concern for oneself, or it can cause oneself to feel the emotion of empathy and 
concern for the other person in need. Our findings seem to indicate that participants 
who showed a greater extent of empathy for pain demonstrated both tendencies to 
reply either with personal distress or with empathic concern when seeing others in 
need. As the other results of this study show, one factor that could decide whether 
one reacts to seeing someone in need with empathic concern or personal distress is 
whether one observes an in- or an out-group member. 
 
We also found a significant correlation between EEG data and the amount of 
empathic concern, which describes other-oriented feelings of concern that one has 
when observing others in need. Participants who for the difference of pain minus no 
pain showed more alpha suppression for original or violet colored White stimuli than 
for original or violet colored Black stimuli, also showed higher ratings of empathic 
concern. Hence, it is possible to infer that if an individual is particularly prone to feel 
empathic concern, they are also likely to show more empathy for pain for in-group 
than for out-group members. This is a particularly interesting finding because 
empathic concern is considered an important predictor of whether seeing a 
conspecific in need will result in helping behavior (Batson et al., 1987, Lamm et al., 
2007). If one has extraordinary high empathic concern for in-group members, then 
one would also show more helping behavior towards in-group members. In fact, we 
attempted to include a measurement of prosocial behavior which asked participants to 
prepare envelopes for donations which would benefit White or Black patients. Results 
showed though that participants generally decided to help both White and Black 
patients. However, this might have been caused by a very low validity of this 
measurement, as participants did not seem to believe that they would actually have to 
prepare these envelopes after the experiment. 
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Surprisingly, no significant correlation was found between EEG data and 
measurements of implicit or explicit racial bias. One reason for this could be that 
even though participants clearly demonstrated a racial bias in the EEG experiments, 
they inhibited this racial bias when explicitly having to answer questions about 
prejudice and stereotypes. Very interestingly, a significant correlation was found that 
the higher ratings of unpleasantness for the difference of pain minus no pain for 
original colored White stimuli than for original colored Black stimuli were, the less 
White preference and colder feelings for Blacks were reported. Moreover, a tendency 
for a significant correlation was found that the higher ratings of painfulness for the 
difference of pain minus no pain for original colored White stimuli than for original 
colored Black stimuli were, the colder feelings towards Blacks, more negative 
attitudes towards Blacks and less implicit motivation to respond without prejudice 
were reported. 
 
In regard to whether EEG data and explicit measures of familiarity would correlate in 
a positive or negative way, one could argue that more familiarity or contact with out-
groups could decrease stereotypes and prejudices, but also that more familiarity or 
contact with these out-groups could increase stereotypes and prejudices. The one 
significant result we found was that participants who showed more alpha suppression 
for the difference of pain minus no pain for original colored White stimuli than for 
original colored Black stimuli also demonstrated less pleasantness and perceived 
benefit of past and future interactions with Blacks in business settings. In regard to 
behavioral results it was also found that the higher ratings of painfulness for the 
difference of pain minus no pain for original colored White stimuli than for original 
colored Black was and the higher ratings of unpleasantness for the difference of pain 
minus no pain for original colored White stimuli than for original colored Black 
stimuli was, the more current contact with Blacks was reported. 
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5.2 Ideas for Future Research  
 
Six ideas for future research evolved during the project for my master thesis. 
 
First, one could study whether dangerous situations as compared to not dangerous 
situations increase the likelihood of being more concerned for one’s racial in-group 
than a racial out-group. To explore this concept, one could replicate our experiment 
with the addition of one group that has been exposed to a dangerous situation prior to 
the experiment (for instance, a loud explosive sound in the room) and one that has not 
been exposed to such a dangerous situation. A compatible hypothesis would be that 
for participants who have been primed with the dangerous stimuli compared to 
participants who have not been primed this way, empathy for pain is modulated by 
racial group membership to a greater degree. 
 
Second, we predicted that participants who showed more empathy for pain for in-
group members than for out-group members would also demonstrate more prosocial 
behavior towards in-group members than out-group members. However, we did not 
find any such correlation due to the low validity of the proscocial measurement we 
created. It would be an immense contribution to the field of empathy research if one 
would create a valid measurement for prosocial behavior. Then one could also assess 
whether one is likely to demonstrate more prosocial behavior for one’s racial in-
group than out-group. 
 
Third, we conducted our experiment with Austrian and German White participants 
who observed Whites as racial in-group members and Blacks as racial out-group 
members. Since most research on stereotypes and prejudices has been conducted in 
the United States of America where tensions between White Americans and Afro-
Americans are a prominent topic, most research on racial group membership has 
focused on theses two races. However, it would be useful and interesting to replicate 
our study with other races as in- and out-group members. 
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In line with this topic, it would be useful to assess whether empathy for pain is 
modulated by other group differences besides racial group membership, differences 
that at times might be regarded as more important than racial group membership. For 
instance, it would be intriguing to assess if soldiers from the United States Army 
would show a high extent of empathy for pain for fellow soldiers from their nation 
regardless of the skin color, and/or a low extent of empathy for pain for soldiers from 
nations they are currently fighting in war, even if these enemies have the same skin 
color as the participants. 
 
Further, some methodological issues of our study could be explored further. One such 
issue is that some participants mentioned that in regard to the EEG stimuli, they 
experienced the Black hand as more unattractive than the White hand. Other 
participants mentioned they guessed the Black hand was the hand from a woman and 
the White hand was the hand from a man. In order to ensure that the factors of 
attractiveness or sex ascribed to the EEG stimuli does not influence our findings, one 
could replicate our study with new stimuli who control for these factors. 
 
Last, some methodological issues which arouse during the process of EEG analysis 
could be explored further. We found the empathy for pain x race x familiarity 
interaction only to be significant when comparing the baseline of 500 ms pre-stimulus 
to the time of 3250 - 4250 ms post-stimulus which shows a hand being penetrated by 
a needle or touched by a Q-tip. However, we did not find this result when comparing 
the same baseline to the time of 2000 - 3000 ms post-stimulus which shows a needle 
or a Q-tip moving towards the hand. Therefore, one could study in more detail 
whether alpha desynchronization in general is enhanced during empathy for pain 
when one is observing a hand actually being penetrated by a needle or touched by a 
Q-tip than when one is merely observing a hand about to be penetrated by a needle or 
touched by a Q-tip. Further, we focused our analysis on determining the time of 500 
ms pre-stimulus in which a fixation cross is presented as our baseline because we 
wanted our results to be comparable to other recent studies from our research field 
(Yang et al., 2008, Perry et al., 2010, Whitmarsh et a., 2011). However, one could 
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also choose to determine a time as baseline in which a hand without a needle or Q-tip 
is presented. This change in protocol would lesson the expected difference between 
alpha suppression between the fixation cross and the stimuli video, thought to arise 
from the visual processing difference between the simplistic fixation cross video as 
compared to the visually complex stimuli video. Finally, we concentrated on studying 
the frequency band alpha, mainly because it is established to study alpha during 
empathy for pain (Yang et al., 2008, Perry et al., 2010, Whitmarsh et a., 2011). One 
could also investigate other frequency bands such as beta or theta and compare the 
results among the various frequency bands, looking for correlations suggestive of 
empathy for pain.  
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5.3 Theoretical and Practical Implications  
 
As discussed in great detail in this thesis, the phenomenon of having more empathy 
for pain for one’s racial in-group than racial out-groups can be explained from an 
evolutionary perspective. It is hypothesized that empathizing allows oneself to live in 
social groups and strive from evolutionary advantages that this brings with it - such as 
being safer from predators and danger, being cared for from birth by other members 
of the group and having rewarding emotions of affiliation and love for others. 
However, in regard to this evolutionary interpretation one has to point out that when 
empathy began to develop people lived in rather small social groups. Modernity 
requires people to belong to much larger social groups ranging from neighborhoods, 
to cities, states and countries. Hence, for a large social group, it is very maladaptive if 
members disassociate from each other due to their racial group membership. The 
United States, a country defined by migration and immigration, is a particularly good 
example of how important, but often difficult it is for racial groups to understand 
each other and live in peace. Also, for other countries the subject of immigration is 
becoming of greater and greater importance. In Germany recently, neo-nazis 
committed crimes against immigrants and citizens with an immigrant background, 
unacceptable and frightening crimes in an otherwise modernized German society. 
Research on empathy and how empathy is modulated by racial group membership 
can help the development of social programs and policies aimed at improving 
empathy abilities between racial groups and reduce the negative affects of 
stereotyping and prejudice. One can name many fields in which such social programs 
and policies can be realized, such as schools, universities or businesses. Also, the 
field of clinical psychology can profit from considering our research. Culturally 
sensitive psychotherapies for minorities assess what culture the client is identifying 
with and how symptoms and diagnoses manifest themselves in these cultures. If 
therapists know in advance that they might have less empathy for patients from racial 
out-groups, then it may be easier to identify thoughts and feelings working against the 
therapy, which can ultimately increase their effectiveness as clinicians. 
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A.  Informed Consent to Participate in an 
EEG Study 
 
Probandeninformation und Einverständniserklärung zur EEG-Ableitung 
 
Wir laden Sie ein, an unser Studie als freiwillige(r) Proband(in) teilzunehmen. 
 
Im Rahmen dieser Studie soll die Hirnaktivität in Zusammenhang mit der gestellten 
Aufgabeuntersucht werden. Ziel der Studie ist, den zeitlichen Ablauf bestimmter 
Verarbeitungsschritte zu erfassen und aufzuklären, welche Gehirnareale für die 
beteiligten Prozesse zuständig sind. 
 
Was ist ein EEG? 
Mit Hilfe der Elektroenzephalographie (EEG) wird auf nicht-invasive Weise die vom 
Gehirn ausgehende elektrische Aktivität von der Kopfhaut abgeleitet. Diese Aktivität 
entsteht durch die ständige Signalübertragung der Nervenzellen untereinander. Die 
Aktivität der Nervenzellen in den verschiedenen Regionen des Gehirns unterscheidet 
sich je nach Art der Aufgabe, die das Gehirn gerade durchführt (z.B. Sprechen, 
Kopfrechnen, Gedächtnis). Das EEG kann somit über verschiedenste Funktionen des 
Gehirns Aufschluss geben. 
Dabei werden Elektroden auf der Kopfhaut plaziert, die Veränderungen in der 
elektrischen Spannung des Grosshirns kontinuierlich erfassen und aufzeichnen. Die 
aufgezeichneten Signale werden dann verstärkt, über viele Durchgänge hinweg 
gemittelt, und schließlich mit Hilfe statistischer Verfahren ausgewertet. 
 
Ablauf der Studie 
Vor der eigentlichen EEG-Messung (die Dauer variiert zwischen 45 Minuten und 1,5 
Stunden) werden insgesamt 64 EEG-Elektroden am Kopf, über und neben dem 
rechten und linken Auge sowie am Schlüsselbein und im Genick angebracht 
(Applikationsdauer ca. 1 Std.). Um den Übergangswiderstand zwischen Haut und 
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Elektrode möglichst gering zu halten, wird dort, wo die Elektroden sitzen, die oberste 
Hautschicht mit einer sterilen Nadel leicht angekratzt. Das fühlt sich etwa so an, wie 
wenn man mit dem Fingernagel an der Kopfhaut kratzt. Der Versuchsraum ist mit 
einer Überwachungskamera mit dem Kontrollraum verbunden, sodass Sie immer mit 
den Versuchsleitern Kontakt aufnehmen können. 
Während der Messung werden Ihnen über den Bildschirm Aufgaben präsentiert, die 
Sie möglichst gut und konzentriert lösen sollen. 
 
Risiken und Unannehmlichkeiten der Untersuchung: 
Die EEG-Messung ist schmerzfrei und ohne Gesundheitsrisiko. Sämtliche mit der 
Haut in Kontakt kommende Materialen sind desinfiziert. Die für die Applikaton 
verwendeten Chemikalien (Elektrodenpaste, Desinfektionsmittel) sind in den 
verwendeten Konzentrationen und Dosierungen gesundheitlich unbedenklich. 
Es werden nur an der Kophaut vorhandene elektrische Ströme abgeleitet, die vom 
Gehirn produziert werden. Es wird keinerlei Strom zugeführt. Durch speziell geerdete 
Geräte besteht keine Gefahr elektromagnetischer Induktion. 
 
Ihre Rechte: 
Selbstverständlich können Sie vor und jederzeit während der Untersuchung weitere 
Informationen über Zweck, Ablauf, etc. der Studie von den durchführenden Personen 
erfragen. Sie können die Studie jederzeit, auch ohne Angabe von Gründen und ohne 
dass sich für Sie daraus Nachteile ergeben, von sich aus abbrechen. 
 
Teilnahmebeschränkungen: 
Sie dürfen nicht an der Untersuchung teilnehmen, wenn Sie: 
1.) Brüche (Schädelbruch) oder Implantate am Kopf haben oder hatten, 
2.) Ekzeme oder Muttermale auf der Kopfhaut oder allgemein leicht reizbare Haut am 
Kopf haben, 
3.) eine ansteckende Blutkrankheit (z.B. HIV) haben, 
4.) Angst vor Nadeln haben, 
5.) an Diabetes oder Blutkrankheit leiden, 
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6.) eine neurologische Erkrankung haben (z.B. Schwindelanfälle, Epilepsie), 
7.) regelmäßig Psychopharmaka einnehmen. 
 
Datenschutz: 
Sämtliche Ihre Person betreffenden Daten werden getrennt von den bei Ihnen 
erhobenen EEG-Daten (und getrennt von eventuellen Fragebögen) aufbewahrt, so 
dass Ihre Anonymität stets gewahrt bleibt. Die bei Ihnen erhobenen Daten fließen in 
eine Gruppenanalyse ein, deren Ergebnisse in einer wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift 
veröffentlicht werden sollen. 
 
Einverständniserklärung 
Durch Ihre Unterschrift bestätigen Sie, dass Sie die Patienteninformation gelesen und 
verstanden haben. Sie erklären sich mit der Teilnahme an dieser Studie sowie der 
Analyse ihrer Daten durch befugte Personen einverstanden. 
Sie wurden darauf hingewiesen, dass Sie den Anweisungen der 
studiendurchführenden Mitarbeiter im Interesse Ihrer eigenen Sicherheit 
nachkommen sollen und dass ein Verschweigen von bestehenenden 
Krankheitszuständen oder der Studie unmittelbar vorangegangenen 
Medikamenteneinnahme Ihre eigene Sicherheit gefährden kann. 
 
Name: 
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
Geboren am:
 ______________________________________________________________ 
 
Datum: ____________________ Unterschrift: ____________________ 
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Ich bestätige, dass ich oben genannte(n) ProbandIn über Zweck und Art der Studie 
informiert habe: 
 
Name des Untersuchungsleiters:       
    ____________________________________________ 
 
Unterschrift:          
    ____________________________________________ 
 
Datum:          
    ____________________________________________ 
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B. Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) 
 
Edinburgh Händigkeits-Inventar 
 
Name:  
 ____________________________________________________________ 
Geburtsdatum: 
 ____________________________________________________________ 
 
Bitte geben Sie an, welche Hand Sie für die folgenden Aktivitäten bevorzugt 
verwenden, indem Sie ein + in die entsprechende Spalte schreiben. Markieren Sie 
bitte die Fälle, in denen Sie nie die andere Hand verwenden würden, außer Sie wären 
absolut dazu gezwungen, mit ++. Für Fälle, in denen Sie keine Hand bevorzugt 
verwenden, schreiben Sie + in beide Spalten. Einige Aktivitäten erfordern beide 
Hände. In diesen Fällen wird auf den Teil der Aufgabe oder des Objektes, für den Sie 
die bevorzugte Hand angeben sollen, in Klammern hingewiesen. Bitte bemühen Sie 
sich, alle Fragen zu beantworten. Lassen Sie eine Frage nur dann aus, wenn Sie gar 
keine Erfahrung mit der Aufgabe oder dem Objekt haben. 
 
  LINKS RECHTS 
1 Schreiben   
2 Zeichnen   
3 Werfen   
4 Schere   
5 Zahnbürste   
6 Messer (ohne Gabel)   
7 Löffel   
8 Besen (obere Hand)   
9 Streichholz anzünden   
10 Schachtel öffnen (Deckel)   
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C. Instructions for EEG Assessment  
 
Erster Bildschirm 
Willkommen! 
Vielen Dank, dass Sie an unserem EEG-Experiment teilnehmen! 
 
Zum Ablauf: 
Die EEG-Aufzeichnung  wird ca. 45 Minuten dauern. 
Danach werden die VersuchsleiterInnen Ihnen noch ein paar andere Tests und 
Fragebögen geben. Dies wird noch einmal ca. 45 Minuten dauern. 
 
...weiter mit dem Drücken einer beliebigen Taste... 
 
Zweiter Bildschirm 
Wir hoffen auf gute verwertbare Daten. Dies kann jedoch nur erreicht werden, wenn 
Sie versuchen während des ganzen Experiments aufmerksam zu sein. Sollten Sie 
müde werden oder sollten Sie sich überanstrengt fühlen, so nutzen Sie bitte die 
Pausen. Sie können entscheiden, wie lange die Pausen sind. Beenden Sie eine Pause 
bitte erst, wenn Sie denken, dass Sie wieder aufmerksam fortfahren können. 
Insgesamt gibt es 7 Pausen. 
 
Es wurde viel Arbeit in die Planung dieser Diplomarbeitsstudie investiert. Wir 
hoffen, dass Sie sich als Versuchsperson anstrengen, damit wir unsere 
Diplomarbeitsstudie mit Erfolg durchführen können. 
 
Vielen Dank! 
 
...weiter mit dem Drücken einer beliebigen Taste... 
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Dritter Bildschirm 
Sie werden nun vier Videos zur Übung sehen. 
 
...weiter mit dem Drücken einer beliebigen Taste... 
 
Vierter Bildschirm 
Sie haben nun noch einmal die Möglichkeit, den VersuchsleiterInnen Fragen zu 
stellen. 
 
...Wenn Sie bereit sind mit dem Experiment zu beginnen und keine Fragen mehr 
haben, drücken sie bitte eine beliebige Taste... 
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D. Assessment of Painfulness, 
Unpleasantness and Believability of Stimuli 
 
Erster Bildschirm 
Sie werden nun noch mal ein paar Videos sehen. 
 
Nach jedem Video werden Ihnen immer 3 Fragen gestellt: 
 
1.) "Wie schmerzhaft für den Menschen?" 
Hier sollen Sie einschätzen, wie schmerzhaft die im Video zu sehende Situation für 
den Menschen war. 
 
2.) "Wie unangenehm für Sie?" 
Hier sollen Sie einschätzen, wie angenehm oder unangenehm es für Sie war, das 
Video anzusehen. 
 
3.) "Wie real war die Situation?"  
Hier sollen sie einschätzen, wie echt und real die im Video zu sehende Situation für 
Sie war. 
 
...weiter mit dem Drücken einer beliebigen Taste... 
 
Zweiter Bildschirm 
Wir bitten Sie diese Fragen auf einer siebenstelligen Skala zu beantworten. 
 
Die Taste "1" steht für 
gar nicht schmerzhaft, gar nicht unangenehm oder gar nicht real. 
 
Die Taste "7" steht für 
sehr schmerzhaft, sehr  unangenehm oder sehr real. 
 
...weiter mit Drücken einer beliebigen Taste... 
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E. Assessment of Prosocial Behavior 
 
Erster Bildschirm 
Zu ihrer näheren Information: 
 
Die Videos, die Sie gerade gesehen haben, zeigten Patienten. Diese erhielten sehr 
wichtige Injektionen, welche eine schwere Hyperhidrosis Palmaris behandelten. 
 
...weiter mit dem Drücken einer beliebigen Taste... 
 
Zweiter Bildschirm 
Würden Sie diese Woche bei dem Eintüten der Briefe helfen, um diesen Patienten 
weitere wichtige Injektionen zu ermöglichen? 
 
Bitte schauen Sie sich die zwei folgenden Videos an. 
Entscheiden Sie bitte dann, ob Sie für den 1. Patienten und/oder für den 2. Patienten 
Briefe eintüten möchten. 
 
...weiter mit dem Drücken einer beliebigen Taste... 
 
Dritter Bildschirm 
Wären Sie bereit Briefe einzutüten? 
 
0 = Nein 
1 = 15 Minuten für 1. Patient 
2 = 15 Minuten für 2. Patient 
3 = 30 Minuten für beide Patienten 
4 = 30 Minuten für 1. Patient 
5 = 30 Minuten für 2. Patient 
6 = 60 Minuten für beide Patienten 
7 = 15 Minuten für 1. Patient, 30 Minuten für 2. Patient 
8 = 30 Minuten für 1. Patient, 15 Minuten für 2. Patient 
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F. Saarbrücker Persönlichkeitsfragebogen 
(Paulus, 2009) based on Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980) 
 
Sie werden jetzt eine Reihe von Aussagen lesen, die jeweils bestimmte 
(verallgemeinerte) menschliche Eigenschaften oder Reaktionen beschreiben, die alle 
etwas mit Gefühlen zu tun haben. Bitte kennzeichnen Sie dann auf der 5-Punkte-
Skala, inwieweit diese Aussage auf Sie zutrifft; je höher die Zahl, desto höher die 
Zustimmung. Vielleicht fällt Ihnen auch zu der einen oder anderen allgemeinen 
Beschreibung ein konkretes Erlebnis ein. 
 
Es gibt dabei keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten (je größer die Zahl 1-5, desto 
höher ist Ihre Zustimmung). 
 
1 (trifft gar nicht zu) - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 (trifft sehr zu) 
 
1. Ich empfinde warmherzige Gefühle für Leute, denen es weniger gut geht als 
mir. 
2.  Die Gefühle einer Person in einem Roman kann ich mir sehr gut vorstellen. 
3.  In Notfallsituationen fühle ich mich ängstlich und unbehaglich. 
4.  Ich versuche, bei einem Streit zuerst beide Seiten zu verstehen, bevor ich eine  
Entscheidung treffe. 
5. Wenn ich sehe, wie jemand ausgenutzt wird, glaube ich, ihn schützen zu 
müssen. 
6.  Ich fühle mich hilflos, wenn ich inmitten einer sehr emotionsgeladenen 
Situation bin. 
7.  Nachdem ich einen Film gesehen habe, fühle ich mich so, als ob ich eine der 
Personen aus diesem Film sei. 
8.  In einer gespannten emotionalen Situation zu sein, beängstigt mich. 
9.  Mich berühren Dinge sehr, die ich nur beobachte. 
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10.  Ich glaube, jedes Problem hat zwei Seiten und versuche deshalb beide zu 
berücksichtigen. 
11.  Ich würde mich selbst als eine ziemlich weichherzige Person bezeichnen. 
12.  Wenn ich einen guten Film sehe, kann ich mich sehr leicht in die Hauptperson  
hineinversetzen. 
13. In heiklen Situationen neige ich dazu, die Kontrolle über mich zu verlieren. 
14. Wenn mir das Verhalten eines anderen komisch vorkommt, versuche ich mich 
für eine Weile in seine Lage zu versetzen. 
15. Wenn ich eine interessante Geschichte oder ein gutes Buch lese, versuche ich 
mir vorzustellen, wie ich mich fühlen würde, wenn mir die Ereignisse 
passieren würden. 
16. Bevor ich jemanden kritisiere, versuche ich mir vorzustellen, wie ich mich an 
seiner Stelle fühlen würde. 
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G. Stimuli Material of Implicit Association 
Task (Greenwald, McGee & Schwartz, 1998, 
reprinted with the first author’s permission) 
 
Black female stimuli: 
 
Black male stimuli: 
 
White female stimuli: 
 
White male stimuli: 
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H. White Preference Thermometer Difference 
and White Preference Likert (based on Project 
Implicit of Harvard University, 1998) 
 
White Preference Thermometer Difference 
Bitte geben Sie an, inwiefern Sie positive oder negative Gefühle gegenüber den 
folgenden Gruppen haben (0 = negative Gefühle; 5 = neutral; 10 = sehr positive 
Gefühle) 
 
Schwarze Personen 
- 1 (sehr kalt) -  2 - 3  - 4  - 5 (neutral) - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (sehr warm) -     
      
Weiße Personen 
 - 1 (sehr kalt) -  2 - 3  - 4  - 5 (neutral) - 6 - 7 - 8 - 9 - 10 (sehr warm) -  
 
 
 
White Preference Likert 
Welche Aussage trifft am ehesten auf Sie zu? 
Bitte auswählen: 
 - Ich bevorzuge weiße Menschen stark gegenüber schwarzen Menschen. -  
 - Ich bevorzuge weiße Menschen mittel gegenüber schwarzen Menschen. -  
 - Ich bevorzuge weiße Menschen ein bisschen gegenüber schwarzen Menschen. -  
 - Ich mag weiße Personen und schwarze Personen gleichermaßen. -  
 - Ich bevorzuge schwarze Menschen ein bisschen gegenüber weißen Menschen. -  
 - Ich bevorzuge schwarze Menschen mittel gegenüber weißen Menschen. -  
 - Ich bevorzuge schwarze Menschen stark gegenüber weißen Menschen. -  
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I. Attitudes towards Blacks Scale (Brigham, 
1993) 
 
Dieser Fragebogen besteht aus 20 Fragen, die sich auf ihre Meinungen bezüglich 
aktueller sozialer Themen beziehen. Bitte antworten Sie auf diese Fragen mithilfe der 
angegebenen siebenstelligen Skala, bei der 1 = starke Zustimmung und 7 = starke 
Ablehnung der Aussage bedeutet. Schreiben Sie eine Zahl von 1 bis 7, welche am 
besten Ihre Meinung darstellt, auf die Zeile links neben jeder Aussage. Bitte 
beantworten sie jede Frage; und lassen Sie keine aus. Es gibt keine “richtigen” oder 
“falschen” Antworten; bitte seien Sie so ehrlich und offen, wie Sie können. Alle 
Antworten werden vertraulich behandelt und nur als Gruppendaten analisiert. 
Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme! 
 
1 = stark nicht zustimmen 
2 = nicht zustimmen 
3 = ein bisschen nicht zustimmen 
4 = weder zustimmen noch nicht zustimmen 
5 = ein bisschen zustimmen 
6 = zustimmen 
7 = stark zustimmen 
  
1. Ich genieße einen lustigen rassistischen Witz, auch wenn manche Leute dies 
vielleicht anstößig finden. 
2. Wenn ich die Möglichkeit hätte schwarze Gäste meinen Freunden und 
Nachbarn vorzustellen, würde ich dies gerne machen. 
3. Ich möchte lieber nicht, dass schwarze Menschen in demselben Wohngebäude 
leben wie ich. 
4. Von der Integration von Personen mit verschiedensten Hautfarben (in 
Schulen, Betrieben, Wohnorten, ect.) haben sowohl weiße als auch schwarze 
Menschen profitiert. 
5. Ich würde mich vermutlich etwas befangen fühlen, mit einem schwarzen 
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Menschen in der Öffentlichkeit zu tanzen. 
6. Ich glaube, dass schwarze Menschen einander ähnlicher sehen als weiße 
Menschen. 
7. Es würde mich nicht stören, wenn mein neuer Mitbewohner/ meine neue 
Mitbewohnerin schwarz wäre. 
8. Einer Ehe, in der die Partner verschiedene Hautfarben haben, sollte abgeraten 
werden, um die „wer-bin-ich“-Verwirrung, welche die Kinder fühlen werden, 
zu vermeiden. 
9. Wenn mein Vorgesetzter ein schwarzer Mensch wäre, würde es mich nicht 
stören Ratschläge und Anleitungen von ihm oder ihr anzunehmen. 
10. Im Allgemeinen sind schwarze Menschen nicht so klug wie weiße Menschen. 
11. Die Regierung sollte entscheidende Schritte gegen Ungerechtigkeiten 
einleiten, die schwarze Menschen durch ansässige Behörden erleiden. 
12. Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass schwarze Menschen Gewalt in Nachbarschaften 
bringen, wenn sie dort hinziehen. 
13. Schwarze und weiße Menschen sind an sich gleich. 
14. Es regt mich sehr auf, wenn ich höre, dass ein weißer Mensch eine 
vorurteilbehaftete Äußerung gegenüber schwarzen Menschen macht. 
15. Ich bin besorgt, dass ich in den nächsten Jahren aufgrund der Bevorzugung 
von Gruppenmitgliedern von Minderheiten einen Job oder eine Beförderung 
nicht erhalte. 
16. Ich bevorzuge Wohnungsgesetze, die mehr Integration von Menschen mit 
verschiedensten Hautfarben in Nachbarschaften erlauben. 
17. Schwarze Menschen fordern zu viel zu schnell in ihrer Bemühung um gleiche 
Rechte. 
18. Es würde mich nicht stören, wenn eine schwarze Familie mit einem mir 
ähnlichem Einkommen und Bildungsniveau neben mir einziehen würde. 
19. Weiße Menschen sollten schwarze Menschen in ihrem Kampf gegen 
Diskriminierung und Segregation unterstützen. 
20. Manche schwarze Menschen sind so empfindlich in Bezug auf ihre Hautfarbe, 
dass es schwierig ist mit ihnen auszukommen. 
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J. Internal and External Motivation to 
Respond without Prejudice (Plant & Devine, 
1998) 
 
Translated in German from original English version: 
 
Instruktion: Die folgenden Fragen betreffen verschiedenste Gründe und 
Motivationen, die man haben kann, um unvoreingenommen gegenüber schwarzen 
Menschen zu sein. Manche dieser Gründe repräsentieren internal-persönliche 
Motivationen, während andere eher external-soziale Motivationen repräsentieren. 
Natürlich kann man aufgrund von internaler und externaler Gründe eine gewisse 
Motivation haben; wir möchten betonen, dass keine der beiden Arten von Motivation 
besser ist als die andere. Darüber hinaus möchten wir klarstellen, dass wir Sie und 
Ihre persönlichen Antworten nicht bewerten, alle Ihre Antworten werden 
vollkommen vertraulich behandelt. Wir möchten uns lediglich ein Bild davon 
machen, welche Art von Motivationen Studenten im Allgemeinen haben, um 
unvoreingenommen zu reagieren. Damit wir irgendetwas Nützliches erfahren, ist es 
wichtig, dass Sie jede Frage offen und ehrlich beantworten. Bitte geben Sie Ihre 
Antworten entsprechend der vorgegebenen Skalen. 
 
- 1 ( stimme stark nicht zu ) - 2 -  3  - 4  - 5  - 6  - 7 (stimme stark zu) - 
  
1. Aufgrund von der heutigen Standards bezüglich  politischer Korrektheit 
versuche ich nicht voreingenommen gegenüber schwarzen Menschen zu 
wirken. 
2. Ich versuche jegliche negative Gedanken über schwarze Menschen zu 
verstecken, um negative Reaktionen anderer zu vermeiden. 
3. Wenn ich mich voreingenommen gegenüber schwarzen Menschen verhalten 
hätte, würde ich beunruhigt sein, dass mir andere böse sind. 
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4. Ich versuche unvoreingenommen gegenüber schwarzen Menschen zu 
erscheinen, um Missbilligung anderer zu vermeiden. 
5. Ich versuche aufgrund von Drängen anderer unvoreingenommen gegenüber 
schwarzen Menschen zu handeln. 
6. Ich versuche unvoreingenommen gegenüber schwarzen Menschen zu handeln, 
weil es für mich persönlich wichtig ist. 
7. Meinen persönlichen Werten nach, ist es in Ordnung Stereotype über 
schwarze Menschen zu verwenden. 
8. Ich bin persönlich durch meine Überzeugungen motiviert, unvoreingenommen 
gegenüber schwarzen Menschen zu sein. 
9. Aufgrund meiner persönlichen Werte glaube ich, dass die Verwendung von 
Stereotypen gegenüber schwarzen Menschen falsch ist. 
10. Unvoreingenommen gegenüber schwarzen Menschen zu sein, ist wichtig für 
mein Selbstkonzept. 
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K. Social Experiences Questionnaire 
(Brigham, 1993) 
 
Translated in German from original English version: 
 
Wir werden Sie nun über Ihre persönlichen Erfahrungen mit schwarzen Menschen 
befragen. Wir interessieren uns nicht für Situationen, in denen Sie einen schwarzen 
Menschen beobachtet haben, ohne dass dieser auf Sie reagiert hat (z.B. in der 
Öffentlichkeit). Vielmehr sind wir interessiert an Situationen, in denen Sie Grüße 
ausgetauscht haben, sich miteinander unterhalten haben, mit einander gearbeitet 
haben, Informationen oder Dienstleistungen erfragt, erhalten oder gegeben haben, 
oder in anderer Art miteinander interagiert haben. Wenn Sie beispielsweise einen 
schwarzen Menschen in einem Restaurant anschauen, handelt es sich nicht um eine 
Interaktion solange er nicht in einer ähnlichen Weise auf Sie reagiert, z.B. indem er 
mit ihnen Augenkontakt hat. Ebenso handelt es sich um keine Interaktion, wenn Sie 
angeschaut werden, ohne dass Sie in einer ähnlichen Weise reagieren. 
 
Wir werden Ihnen in vier Teilen Fragen über ihre persönlichen Erfahrungen mit 
schwarzen Menschen stellen. Zuerst werden wir ihnen generelle Fragen stellen, 
gefolgt von Fragen über ihre Interaktionen in beruflichen Situationen, intimen-
persönlichen Situationen, und sozialen / öffentlichen Situationen. Danach werden wir 
Sie fragen, in welchem Ausmaß diese Interaktionen in den verschiedenen Situationen 
angenehm oder unangenehm waren. 
 
Wenn nach Prozentangaben gefragt wird, gelten folgende Zahlen: 
(0) = 0-9% 
(1) = 10-19% 
(2) = 20-29% 
(3) = 30-39% 
(4) = 40-49% 
(5) = 50-59% 
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(6) = 60-69% 
(7) = 70-79% 
(8) = 80-89% 
(9) = 90-100% 
 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
  
1. Circa wie viel Prozent der Schüler Ihrer Grundschule waren schwarze 
Menschen? 
2. Wie viele schwarze Freunde hatten Sie in ihrer Grundschule? (9 = 9 oder 
mehr) 
3.  Circa wie viel Prozent der Schüler Ihrer Oberschule (Klasse 4 oder 7 bis 
Klasse 10) waren schwarze Menschen? 
4. Wie viele schwarze Freunde hatten Sie in Ihrer Oberschule (Klasse 4 oder 7 
bis Klasse 10)? (9 = 9 oder mehr) 
5. Circa wie viel Prozent der Schüler Ihrer Oberschule (Klasse 11 bis Klasse 12 
oder 13) waren schwarze Menschen? 
6. Wie viele schwarze Freunde hatten Sie in Ihrer Oberschule (Klasse 11 bis 
Klasse 12 oder 13)? (9 = 9 oder mehr) 
7.   Circa wie viel Prozent der Menschen in Ihrer Nachbarschaft, in der Sie 
aufgewachsen sind, waren schwarze Menschen? 
8.   Über den Zeitraum einer durchschnittlichen Woche, mit circa wie vielen 
schwarzen Menschen unterhalten Sie sich? (9 = 9 oder mehr) 
9. Über den Zeitraum einer durchschnittlichen Woche, mit circa wie vielen 
schwarzen Menschen unterhalten Sie sich in der Universität? (9 = 9 oder 
mehr) 
10.   ... während Freizeitaktivitäten (Sport, Parties, ect.)? (9 = 9 oder mehr) 
11.  ... in Geschäften? (9 = 9 oder mehr) 
12.   ... in Studentenwohnheimen oder Wohngebäuden? (9 = 9 oder mehr) 
13.  Wie viele schwarze Menschen kennen Sie in Österreich bei Vornamen, 
welche Sie ebenfalls bei Vornamen kennen? (9 = 9 oder mehr) 
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14. Wie viele von Ihren neun engsten Freunden sind schwarze Menschen? 
15.   Wie viele Male sind sie mit einem schwarzen Menschen auf ein Date 
ausgegangen oder  
waren mit einem schwarzen Menschen in einer Beziehung? (9 = 9 oder mehr) 
 
 
Bitte beantworten Sie die folgenden Fragen auf einer siebenstelligen Skala. 
 
 
BERUFLICHES UMFELD 
1. Im Allgemeinem, wie viel Interaktion haben sie mit schwarzen Menschen im 
beruflichen Umfeld? (1 = keine; 7 = sehr viel)         
2.  Durchschnittlich betrachtet, wie angenehm oder unangenehm waren diese 
Interaktionen? (1 = sehr unangenehm; 7 = sehr angenehm)        
3. Durchschnittlich betrachtet, haben Sie Interaktionen mit schwarzen Menschen 
im beruflichen Umfeld etwas gekostet oder haben Sie von ihnen profitiert? (1 
= kostspielig; 7 = profitabel)          
4. Wie angenehm oder unangenehm, glauben Sie, werden Interaktionen mit 
schwarzen Menschen im beruflichen Umfeld in der Zukunft sein? (1 = sehr 
unangenehm; 7 = sehr angenehm) 
          
INTIM-PERSÖNLICHES UMFELD 
1. Im Allgemeinem, wie viel Interaktion haben sie mit schwarzen Menschen im  
intim-persönlichem Umfeld? (1 = keine; 7 = sehr viel) 
2. Durchschnittlich betrachtet, wie angenehm oder unangenehm waren diese 
Interaktionen? (1 = sehr unangenehm; 7 = sehr angenehm) 
3. Durchschnittlich betrachtet, haben Sie Interaktionen mit schwarzen Menschen 
im intim-persönlichem Umfeld etwas gekostet oder haben Sie von ihnen 
profitiert? (1 = kostspielig; 7 = profitabel) 
4. Wie angenehm oder unangenehm, glauben Sie, werden Interaktionen mit 
schwarzen Menschen im intim-persönlichem Umfeld in der Zukunft sein? (1 
= sehr unangenehm; 7 = sehr angenehm) 
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SOZIAL-ÖFFENTLICHES UMFELD 
1. Im Allgemeinem, wie viel Interaktion haben sie mit schwarzen Menschen im  
sozial-öffentlichem Umfeld? (1 = keine; 7 = sehr viel)          
2. Durchschnittlich betrachtet, wie angenehm oder unangenehm waren diese 
Interaktionen? (1 = sehr unangenehm; 7 = sehr angenehm) 
3.  Durchschnittlich betrachtet, haben Sie Interaktionen mit schwarzen Menschen 
im sozial-öffentlichem Umfeld etwas gekostet oder haben Sie von ihnen 
profitiert? (1 = kostspielig; 7 = profitabel)          
4. Wie angenehm oder unangenehm, glauben Sie, werden Interaktionen mit 
schwarzen Menschen im sozial-öffentlichem Umfeld in der Zukunft sein? (1 = 
sehr unangenehm; 7 = sehr angenehm)  
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L. Balanced Inventory of Desirable 
Responding (Musch, Brockhaus & Bröder, 
2002)  
 
Geben Sie bitte für jede Aussage an, wie sehr Sie ihr zustimmen, von 1 (= völlige 
Ablehnung) bis 7 (= völlige Zustimmung). Bitte lassen Sie keine Frage aus. 
 
- 1 (trifft überhaupt nicht zu) - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 (trifft völlig zu) - 
 
1. Der erste Eindruck, den ich von anderen Menschen gewinne, bewahrheitet 
sich meistens. 
2. Ich bin nicht immer mir selber gegenüber ganz ehrlich gewesen. 
3. Ich weiß immer, warum ich etwas mag. 
4. Es fällt mir schwer, einen beunruhigenden Gedanken beiseite zu drängen. 
5. Manchmal verpasse ich etwas, weil ich mich einfach nicht schnell genug 
entscheiden kann. 
6. Ich bin ein vollkommen rational denkender Mensch. 
7. Ich kann Kritik selten vertragen. 
8. Ich bin mir meiner Urteile sehr sicher. 
9. An meinen Fähigkeiten als Liebhaber habe ich schon gelegentlich gezweifelt. 
10. Ich weiß nicht immer die Gründe für meine Handlungen. 
11. Manchmal lüge ich, wenn ich muss. 
12. Es ist schon einmal vorgekommen, dass ich jemanden ausgenutzt habe. 
13. Ich fluche niemals. 
14. Manchmal zahle ich es lieber anderen heim, als dass ich vergebe und 
vergesse. 
15. Ich habe schon einmal zu viel Wechselgeld bekommen, ohne es der 
Verkäuferin zu sagen. 
16. Ich gebe grundsätzlich alles an, was ich zu verzollen habe. 
17.  Manchmal fahre ich schneller, als es erlaubt ist. 
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18. Ich habe Dinge getan, von denen ich anderen nichts erzähle. 
19. Ich nehme niemals Dinge an mich, die mir nicht gehören. 
20. Ich bin schon einmal wegen einer angeblichen Krankheit nicht zur Arbeit oder 
Schule gegangen. 
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M. Demographic Information (partly based on 
the demographic information from Project 
Implicit of Harvard University, 1998) 
 
Zum Schluss bitten wir Sie noch einige Angaben zu Ihrer Person zu machen. 
Selbstverständlich werden auch diese Angaben strengst vertraulich behandelt und 
können nicht mit Ihrem Namen in Verbindung gebracht werden. 
 
Alter 
Bitte auswählen: 
18 - 19 - 20 - 21 - 22 - 23 - 24 - 25 - 26 - 27 - 28 - 29 - 30 - 
31 - 32 - 33 - 34 - 35 - 36 - 37 - 38 - 39 - 40 
 
Geschlecht 
Bitte auswählen: 
weiblich - männlich 
 
Ethnischer Hintergrund 
Bitte auswählen: 
Europäisch - Ostasiatisch - Südasiatisch - Afrikanisch - Mehrere - Andere oder 
Unbekannt 
 
Politische Einstellung 
Bitte auswählen: 
stark rechts - gemäßigt rechts - eher rechts - neutral - eher links - gemäßigt links - 
stark links 
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Bevorzugte Partei 
Bitte auswählen: 
Österreich: ÖVP - Österreich: SPÖ - Österreich: die Grünen - Österreich: FPÖ - 
Österreich: BZÖ - Österreich: Liberales Forum - Österreich: Kommunistische Partei 
Österreichs - Deutschland: CDU - Deutschland: SPD - Deutschland: die Linke - 
Deutschland: die Grünen - Deutschland: FPD - Andere 
 
 
Religiöse Zugehörigkeit 
Bitte auswählen: 
Katholisch - Evangelisch - Jüdisch - Muslimisch - Buddhistisch - Hindu - Sikh - 
Andere - Keine 
 
Religiosität 
Bitte auswählen: 
sehr religiös - gemäßigt religiös - wenig religiös - überhaupt nicht religiös 
 
Bildung 
Bitte auswählen: 
Volksschule - Hauptschulabschluss - Berufsbildende Höhere Schule bzw. Lehre - 
Matura oder Fachhochschulreife - Universität oder Fachhochschule ohne Abschluss - 
Magister - Bachelor - Master - Diplom - Promotion - Andere 
 
Wenn Sie eine Universität besucht haben, geben Sie uns bitte Ihr Hauptfach an 
oder das Fach, in dem Sie Ihren höchsten Abschluss haben. 
Bitte auswählen: 
Biologie oder Lebenswissenschaften - Wirtschaftswissenschaften - 
Kommunikationswissenschaften - Informatik - Pädagogik - Physik, Mathematik, 
Ingenieurswissenschaften - Medizin oder Gesundheitswissenschaften - 
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Geisteswissenschaften oder Studium Generale - Jus - Psychologie - 
Gesellschaftswissenschaften oder Geschichte - Kunst - Andere 
 
Land / Region Ihres derzeitigen Wohnorts 
Bitte auswählen: 
Österreich - Deutschland - U.S.A. - Afghanistan - Albanien - Algerien - Andorra - 
Angola - Anguilla - Antarktis - Antigua und Barbuda - Argentinien - Armenien - 
Aruba - Australien - Aserbaidschan - Bahamas - Bahrain - Bangladesch - Barbados - 
Belarus - Belgien - Belize - Benin - Bermuda - Bhutan - Bolivien - Bosnien-
Herzegowina - Botswana - Bouvet Islands - Brasilien - Britisch-Inidischer Ozean - 
Brunei - Bulgarien - Burkina Faso - Burundi - Kambodscha - Kamerun - Kanada - 
Kap Verde - Cayman Islands - Zentralafrikanische Republik - Tschad - Chile - China 
- Weihnachtsinsel - Cocos (Keeling) Islands - Kolumbien - Comoros - Kongo - 
Kongo, Demokratische Republik von - Cook Islands - Costa Rica - Elfenbeinküste - 
Kroatien - Kuba - Zypern - Tschechische Republik - Dänemark - Djibouti - Dominica 
- Dominikanische Republik , Ost-Timor - Ecuador - Ägypten - El Salvador - 
Äquatorial-Guinea - Eritrea - Estland - Äthiopien - Falkland Inseln - Faröer Inseln - 
Fidschi Inseln - Finnland - Frankreich - Französisch Guayana - Französisch 
Polynesien - Französische Südprovinzen - Gabun - Gambia - Georgien - Ghana - 
Gibraltar - Griechenland - Grönland - Grenada - Guadeloupe - Guam - Guatemala - 
Guiena - Guiena-Bissau - Guyana - Haiti - Heard and McDonalds Island - Honduras - 
Hong Kong S.A.R. - Ungarn - Island - Indien - Indonesien - Iran - Irak - Irland- Israel 
- Italien - Jamaika - Japan - Jordanien - Kasachstan - Kenia - Kiribati - Korea - 
Nordkorea - Kuwait - Kirgisistan - Laos - Lettland - Libanon - Lesotho - Liberien - 
Lybien - Liechtenstein - Litauen - Luxembourg - Macau S.A.R. - Mazedonien, 
Ehemalige Jugoslawische Republik von - Madagaskar - Malawi - Malaysia - 
Malediven - Mali - Malta - Marshall Islands - Martinique - Mauretanien - Mauritius - 
Mayotte - Mexiko - Mikronesien - Moldawien - Monaco - Mongolei - Montserrat - 
Marokko - Mosambik - Myanmar, früher Birma - Namibia - Nauru - Nepal - 
Niederländische Antillen - Niederlande, Die - Nekaledonien - Neuseeland - 
Nikaragua - Niger - Nigeria - Niue - Norfolk Inseln - Nord Mariana Inseln - 
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Norwegen - Oman - Pakistan - Palau - Panama - Papua - Neuguinea - Paraguay - Peru 
- Philippinen - Pitcairn Inseln - Polen - Portugal - Puerto Rico - Qatar - Reunion - 
Rumänien - Russland - Ruanda - Samoa  - Sankt Helena - Sankt Kitts und Nevis - 
Sankta Luzia - Sankt Pierre und Miquelon - Sankt Vincent und die Grenadinen - San 
Marino - Sao Tome und Principe - Saudi Arabien - Senegal - Seychellen, die - Sierra 
Leone - Singapur - Slowakei - Slowenien - Salomonseln, die - Somalia - Südafrika - 
Südgeorgien und die Sandwidchinseln - Spanien - Sri Lanka - Sudan - Surinam - 
Spitzbergen und Jan Mayen Inseln - Swasiland - Schweden - Schweiz - Syrien - 
Taiwan - Tadschikistan - Tansania - Thailand - Togo - Tokleau - Tonga - Trinidad 
und Tobago - Tunesien - Türkei - Turkmenistan - Türkische und Caicosische Inseln - 
Tuvala - Uganda - Ukraine - Vereinigte Arabische Emirate - Großbritanien und 
Nordirland - U.S.A. - Vereinigte Staaten (kleinere Inseln) - Uruguay - Usbekistan - 
Vanuatu - Vatikan - Venezuela - Vietnam - Jungferninseln (Britisch) - Virgin Islands 
- Wallis und Futuna Inseln - Yemen - Jugoslawien - Sambia - Simbabwe - Anderes 
Land 
 
Land / Region Ihrer Herkunft 
Bitte auswählen: 
Österreich - Deutschland - U.S.A. - Afghanistan - Albanien - Algerien - Andorra - 
Angola - Anguilla - Antarktis - Antigua und Barbuda - Argentinien - Armenien - 
Aruba - Australien - Aserbaidschan - Bahamas - Bahrain - Bangladesch - Barbados - 
Belarus - Belgien - Belize - Benin - Bermuda - Bhutan - Bolivien - Bosnien-
Herzegowina - Botswana - Bouvet Islands - Brasilien - Britisch-Inidischer Ozean - 
Brunei - Bulgarien - Burkina Faso - Burundi - Kambodscha - Kamerun - Kanada - 
Kap Verde - Cayman Islands - Zentralafrikanische Republik - Tschad - Chile - China 
- Weihnachtsinsel - Cocos (Keeling) Islands - Kolumbien - Comoros - Kongo - 
Kongo, Demokratische Republik von - Cook Islands - Costa Rica - Elfenbeinküste - 
Kroatien - Kuba - Zypern - Tschechische Republik - Dänemark - Djibouti - Dominica 
- Dominikanische Republik , Ost-Timor - Ecuador - Ägypten - El Salvador - 
Äquatorial-Guinea - Eritrea - Estland - Äthiopien - Falkland Inseln - Faröer Inseln - 
Fidschi Inseln - Finnland - Frankreich - Französisch Guayana - Französisch 
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Polynesien - Französische Südprovinzen - Gabun - Gambia - Georgien - Ghana - 
Gibraltar - Griechenland - Grönland - Grenada - Guadeloupe - Guam - Guatemala - 
Guiena - Guiena-Bissau - Guyana - Haiti - Heard and McDonalds Island - Honduras - 
Hong Kong S.A.R. - Ungarn - Island - Indien - Indonesien - Iran - Irak - Irland- Israel 
- Italien - Jamaika - Japan - Jordanien - Kasachstan - Kenia - Kiribati - Korea - 
Nordkorea - Kuwait - Kirgisistan - Laos - Lettland - Libanon - Lesotho - Liberien - 
Lybien - Liechtenstein - Litauen - Luxembourg - Macau S.A.R. - Mazedonien, 
Ehemalige Jugoslawische Republik von - Madagaskar - Malawi - Malaysia - 
Malediven - Mali - Malta - Marshall Islands - Martinique - Mauretanien - Mauritius - 
Mayotte - Mexiko - Mikronesien - Moldawien - Monaco - Mongolei - Montserrat - 
Marokko - Mosambik - Myanmar, früher Birma - Namibia - Nauru - Nepal - 
Niederländische Antillen - Niederlande, Die - Nekaledonien - Neuseeland - 
Nikaragua - Niger - Nigeria - Niue - Norfolk Inseln - Nord Mariana Inseln - 
Norwegen - Oman - Pakistan - Palau - Panama - Papua - Neuguinea - Paraguay - Peru 
- Philippinen - Pitcairn Inseln - Polen - Portugal - Puerto Rico - Qatar - Reunion - 
Rumänien - Russland - Ruanda - Samoa  - Sankt Helena - Sankt Kitts und Nevis - 
Sankta Luzia - Sankt Pierre und Miquelon - Sankt Vincent und die Grenadinen - San 
Marino - Sao Tome und Principe - Saudi Arabien - Senegal - Seychellen, die - Sierra 
Leone - Singapur - Slowakei - Slowenien - Salomonseln, die - Somalia - Südafrika - 
Südgeorgien und die Sandwidchinseln - Spanien - Sri Lanka - Sudan - Surinam - 
Spitzbergen und Jan Mayen Inseln - Swasiland - Schweden - Schweiz - Syrien - 
Taiwan - Tadschikistan - Tansania - Thailand - Togo - Tokleau - Tonga - Trinidad 
und Tobago - Tunesien - Türkei - Turkmenistan - Türkische und Caicosische Inseln - 
Tuvala - Uganda - Ukraine - Vereinigte Arabische Emirate - Großbritanien und 
Nordirland - U.S.A. - Vereinigte Staaten (kleinere Inseln) - Uruguay - Usbekistan - 
Vanuatu - Vatikan - Venezuela - Vietnam - Jungferninseln (Britisch) - Virgin Islands 
- Wallis und Futuna Inseln - Yemen - Jugoslawien - Sambia - Simbabwe - Anderes 
Land 
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N. ANOVA Table for Beta Time 2 
 
Table 5  
Analysis of Variance employing as Dependent Variable the ERSP for the Frequency 
Band Beta (13 - 21 Hz) which was calculated by comparing the baseline of 500 ms 
pre-stimulus to the time window 2 (T2) of 3250-4250 ms post-stimulus 
Source df F η p 
 Between subjects 
Familiarity (F) 1 0.06 .00 .802 
F within-group error 67 (0.37)   
 Within subjects 
Pain (P) 1.00 14.14** .17 .000 
Race (R) 1.00   0.33 .00 .563 
Area (A) 1.81 20.06** .23 .000 
Side (S) 1.90   3.05 .04 .067 
P × F 1.00   0.23?? .00 .627 
P × A 1.83   5.11** .07 .005 
P × A × F 1.83   1.02 .01 .369 
P × S 1.52   1.29 .01 .274 
P × S × F 1.52   0.73 .01 .454 
P × A × S 3.16   1.35 .02 .250 
P × A × S × F 3.16   1.08 .01 .364 
R × F 1.00   5.57** .07 .021 
R × A 1.83   1.25 .01 .288 
R × A × F 1.83   4.04* .05 .024 
R × S 1.70   1.25 .01 .285 
R × S × F 1.70   0.22 .00 .795 
R × A × S 3.81   1.46 .02 .219 
R × A × S × F 3.81   0.25 .00 .893 
P × R 1.00   5.34 .00 .468 
P × R × F 1.00   2.49 .03 .119 
P × R × A 2.01   4.31* .06 .017 
P × R × A × F 2.01   1.26 .01 .284 
P × R × S 1.80   1.29 .01 .272 
P × R × S × F 1.80   0.56 .00 .519 
P × R × A × S 3.66   1.85 .00 .940 
P × R × A × S × F 3.66   1.18 .01 .318 
A × F 1.81   0.31 .00 .731 
S × F 1.90   1.22 .01 .297 
A × S 4.06   4.61** .06 .002 
A × S × F 4.06   0.35 .00 .907 
P × R within group error 67  (1.93)   
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors. F = Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected F values; df = Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom. 
* p ≤  .05. ** p ≤  .01. 
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O.  ABSTRACT IN GERMAN 
 
Obwohl die Literatur der Sozialpsychologie diskutiert, dass rassistische Stereotype 
und Vorurteile in Verbindung stehen mit verminderter Empathie, gibt es wenige 
Studien im Bereich der Neuropsychologie, die diesen Zusammenhang untersuchen. 
37 weiß-häutigen Verspersonen wurden Videos präsentiert, die weiß-häutige oder 
schwarz-häutige Hände zeigten, welche entweder von einer Nadel gestochen  
(Schmerz-Bedingung) oder von einem Q-tip berührt wurden (Kein-Schmerz-
Bedingung), während die Desynchronisationen im Alpha Bereich (7-14 Hz) 
gemessen wurde. 32 Versuchspersonen sahen die gleichen Stimuli wie die anderen 37 
Versuchspersonen, jedoch waren in dieser EEG-Session die Hände digital violett 
eingefärbt, um den Faktor der visuellen Familiarität mit den Stimuli zu kontrollieren. 
In Übereinstimmung mit dem Paradigma ‘Empathie für Schmerz’ löste die Schmerz-
Bedingung eine größere Alpha Desynchronisation aus als die Kein-Schmerz-
Bedingung in frontalen, zentralen, parietalen und okzipitalen Regionen. Diese 
‘Empathie für Schmerz’-Antwort war signifikant niedriger für original gefärbte 
schwarze Stimuli als für original gefärbte weiße Stimuli in zentralen, parietalen und 
okzipitalen Regionen. Da die ‘Empathie für Schmerz’-Antwort in zentralen Regionen 
ähnlich war für original gefärbte weiße Stimuli, violett gefärbte weiße Stimuli und 
violett gefärbte schwarze Stimuli, aber niedriger für original gefärbte schwarze 
Stimuli, hatte der Faktor der visuellen Familiarität keinen Einfluss darauf, dass 
‘Empathie für Schmerz’ von ethnischer Gruppenzugehörigkeit moduliert wird. Wir 
argumentieren, dass die von uns gemessene Alpha Desynchronisation als 
somatosensorische Alpha Desynchronisation interpretiert werden kann, da die 
Schmerzstimuli von sich aus somatosensorischer Natur sind, da die 
somatosensorische Desynchronisation vor allem in einem Zeitintervall gefunden 
wurde, in dem keine Bewegung in den Videos zu sehen war, und da andere Studien 
aus unserem Forschungsgebiet ebenfalls die Interpretation von somatosensorischen 
Oszillationen und somatosensorischer Desynchronisation verteidigen. Die ‘Empathie 
für Schmerz’-Antwort korrelierte mit Einschätzungen der Schmerzintensität und der 
Unannehmlichkeit bezüglich der EEG Stimuli, als auch mit einem explizit 
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gemessenen Maß des persönlichen Disstresses. Der elektrophsyiologische 
Rassistische Bias für ‘Empathie für Schmerz’ korrelierte nicht mit impliziten oder 
expliziten Maßen des Rassistischen Bias. Jedoch korrelierte der auf Grund der 
Einschätzungen der Schmerzintensität und der Unannehmlichkeit bezüglich der EEG 
Stimuli berechnete Rassistische Bias mit dem Bevorzugen von weiß-häutigen 
Menschen und mit der Einstellung gegenüber schwarz-häutigen Menschen. 
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